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Entrepreneurs who engage in investment activity, are usually risk averse. Under
perfect information, complete capital markets provide full insurance against idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty, and ﬁnancial resources to be allocated to the most productive
investment. However, it is a well known fact that market incompleteness resulting
from informational asymmetries – due for instance to moral hazard and adverse
selection – hinders risk diversiﬁcation and reduces the availability of external funds
for risky ventures. This is especially true in the case of small businesses, i.e. small
medium enterprises (SMEs). Entrepreneurs running SMEs will typically have to self-
ﬁnance part of their investment activity and pledge their wealth to obtain credit,
thereby bearing signiﬁcant risks. This has two important consequences, it distorts
the allocation of resources toward low risk – low yield activities and it discourages
access to credit, and thereby investments.
The literature on the functioning of credit markets under asymmetric information
is extremely vast. In this thesis we focus on ﬁrms’ access to credit under diﬀerent
source of asymmetric information and the nature of the market incompleteness they
generate. This is of key importance in order to: a) understand whether the institu-
tional settings that shape the credit markets are eﬃcient; as well as to: b) design
policies capable of ameliorating business access to credit.
Within this broad ﬁeld of research we focuse on:
i. how the functioning of ﬁnancial institution and legal system aﬀects access to
credit;
ii. how the interaction between lenders and borrowers aﬀects the demand and the
supply of credit;
vi
As far as the point (i.) in Chapter 1 we analyze how bankruptcy law, such as the in-
stitution of debt discharge, aﬀects loan contracts. In particular the work evaluates,
under a theoretical and empirical perspective, the eﬀects of debt discharge on access
to credit and cost of credit by taking into account its impact on the role of collat-
eral as a signaling device. In the theoretical model we take explicitly into account
the fact that borrowers can undo the eﬀects of exemption by posting collateral to
secure debt. We use the results from the theoretical analysis, in order to test for the
signaling eﬀect of collateral in a sample of small businesses in the US.
For what concerns point (ii.) in Chapter 2 and 3 we analyze two diﬀerent sit-
uations. In Chapter 2 we study the emergence of the phenomenon of borrowing
discouragement stemming from the combination of uncertainty, asymmetric infor-
mation and costly loan applications. Discouragement becomes a relevant issue in the
credit market especially when credit worthy ﬁrms do not apply causing a potential
misallocation of ﬁnancial resources. Regarding this aspect of access to credit, the
work aims to give a new theoretical view of borrowing discouragement taking into
account other sources of asymmetric information (such as moral hazard) together
with uncertainty on collateral requirements and cost of applications. In Chapter 3
we study the importance of using trade credit to reduce the information asymmetries
between ﬁrms and banks. Under this perspective trade credit work as complemen-
tary ﬁnancing resource. We test the complementarity hypothesis using an empirical
methodology that takes into account the relevance of private information in ﬁrm-
bank relationships.
Pasqualina Arca, Access to credit for SMEs: theories and evidence
Tesi di Dottorato in Diritto ed economia dei sistemi produttivi
Universita` di Sassari
vii
viii Pasqualina Arca, Access to credit for SMEs: theories and evidence
Tesi di Dottorato in Diritto ed economia dei sistemi produttivi
Universita` di Sassari
Chapter 1
Access to credit and cost of credit
with bankruptcy exemption
1.1 Introduction
Personal bankruptcy law in the US allows individuals to choose between two diﬀer-
ent bankruptcy procedures: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.1 If an individual ﬁles under
Chapter 7, her unsecured debt would be mostly discharged. At the same time, the
trustee will liquidate individual’s non-exempt assets to repay creditors. Crucially,
secured creditors can still fully seize the assets pledged as collateral.Types of ex-
empt assets and levels of exemption are decided by individual States. There exists a
widely variation across states. Exemptions can be classiﬁed on the basis of the type
of asset they apply to. Homestead exemption is the exemption on the individual’s
equity in owner-occupied principal residence. Diﬀerently, non-homestead exemption
includes individual’s equity in cars, cash, and other goods such as furniture, cloth-
ing, cooking utensils, farm implements, family bibles, and tools for trade, etc. In
most States, the level of homstead exemption is larger that of the non-homestead
one. Furthermore, non-homestead exemption is generally low across states. Finally,
homestead-exemption is unlimited in some State, and zero in some others.
Unlike Chapter 7, Chapter 13 is more like debt-repayment plan. No debt is
1Whenever it might be relevant, please note that we refer to the bankruptcy law in place prior to the
reform which took place in 2005, since the data we use in the empirical analysis are from 2002.
1
discharged. Agents can keep their assets, and they have to use future earnings to
repay part or all of their debt.
According to chapter 7, bankrupt individuals could beneﬁt from a fresh start
opportunity to the extent that they will keep some assets, while their debt obligation
will be partially redeemed. This has a number of potential consequences on the
functioning of credit markets.
In this paper we analyze the eﬀect of such asset exemption on the cost of credit
and on access to credit in a competitive credit market subject to adverse selection.
Unlike previous literature, in our theoretical analysis we take explicitly into account
the fact that borrowers can undo the eﬀects of exemption by posting collateral to
secure debt. We use the results from the theoretical analysis, in order to test for
the signaling eﬀect of collateral in a sample of small businesses in the US based on
2002 SSBF data.
1.2 Exemption and the role of collateral
Consider a standard adverse selection (AS) framework characterized by a competi-
tive credit market populated by (1) Entrepreneurs who are endowed with one asset
each, and have to borrow to ﬁnance their business; and (2) Competitive lenders
who face an opportunity cost equal to zero, and make zero proﬁts in equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs are of two types: risky (with a high probability of default) and safe
(with a low probability of default). As usual, while each entrepreneur knows her
type, lenders only know the distribution of types.
In a pooling equilibrium where all entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced, safe entrepreneurs
would be subsidizing risky ones. Hence, they could beneﬁt from separation by means
of a signaling device. Collateral could be such device.
There are two identical credit markets, one located in State 1, and the other
located in State 2, where,
1. in State 2’s, no assets are exempt from liquidation in the event of bankruptcy;
2. in State 1’s, all uncollateralized assets are exempt in the case of default.
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Consider ﬁrst the case of State 1. In the event of bankruptcy, entrepreneurs’ assets
are liquidated anyway; independently of whether they were posted as collateral or
not. Therefore, posting collateral plays no role as a signal. Neither the cost of credit
nor access to credit can be aﬀected by the decision to post collateral. Accordingly, in
State 1, the prevailing equilibrium should be a pooling equilibrium where, if ﬁnancial
exchange takes place, the same contract applies to all entrepreneurs, independently
of whether they post any collateral.
Consider now State 2. In the event of bankruptcy, entrepreneurs’ assets will be
liquidated if and only if they were posted as collateral. Hence, if going bankrupt, an
entrepreneur who has posted collateral suﬀers a greater loss than an entrepreneur
who has not. Posting collateral has now an opportunity cost. Crucially, such oppor-
tunity cost is, in expected terms, type-dependent. Risky entrepreneurs have a higher
probability to fail than safe entrepreneurs, so that their expected opportunity cost
from posting collateral is higher than that of safe entrepreneurs. This provides the
sorting condition for a separating equilibrium in which safe entrepreneurs self-select
into contracts characterized by higher collateral requirements. In such equilibrium,
posting collateral results in a lower interest rate for two reasons:
1. Posting collateral increases the cash ﬂow available to ﬁnanciers (Direct eﬀect);
2. Posting collateral signals a lower probability of default (Signaling eﬀect).
We provide a model of the credit market to fully analyze the role of collateral on
cost of credit and access to credit when AS is the source of asymmetric information.
Then, we use the theoretical predictions for the AS case, to identify the signaling
role of collateral using data on the Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) prior
to the 2005 Bankruptcy reform.
1.3 Related literature
Cross-State variability in exemption levels associated with US State bankruptcy laws
prior to the 2005 reform, is key to most empirical investigations on the eﬀects of
exemption. Various papers have examined the eﬀects of exemption rates on interest
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rates and credit rationing. Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) found that interest rates
on car loans where higher in states with higher exemption levels. Lin and White
(2001) found that potential borrowers are more likely to be turned down by banks
the higher is the level of exemption. Berkowitz and White (2004) found that small
businesses borrow less and pay higher interest rates in states with higher exemption
levels. In a similar vein, Berger, Cerqueiro and Penas (2011) ﬁnd that borrowers
have lower access to credit in states with more debtor-friendly levels of exemption.
They also ﬁnd that in such states borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral and
have generally tighter loan terms.
Fan and White (2003) investigate the eﬀects of the bankruptcy system on en-
trepreneurial behavior. States with unlimited homestead exemption are found to
have one-third more entrepreneurs than states with low exemptions. Armour and
Cummings (2005) ﬁnd that countries in which the post-bankruptcy period for which
ﬁlers are obliged to repay from earnings is shorter have more entrepreneurs.
Fay, Hurst and White (2003) tested where pro-debtor bankruptcy laws encourage
borrowers’ opportunistic behavior. Their evidence is that for every $1000 increase
in debtors’ potential gain from bankruptcy, the ﬁling rate raises by 7%.
Finally, Grant and Koeniger (2005) investigate the insurance eﬀects. They ﬁnd
that the variance of consumption over time is lower in states with higher exemption
levels.
1.4 The Model
We consider a competitive market populated by a large number E of entrepreneurs
and a large number L of lenders. The set of entrepreneurs, E , and that of lenders, L,
are indexed by e = 1, ...., E, and l = 1, ...., L, respectively. Both entrepreneurs and
lenders are risk-neutral. Lenders are endowed with one unit of ﬁnancial resources,
each, and face an opportunity cost of capital, r > 0. Each entrepreneur, e, is en-
dowed with an investment opportunity of ﬁxed size one and an amount of pledgeable
wealth, we ∈ [0, w]. With no loss of generality, we set L/E > 1, so that ﬁnancial
resources are abundant. For any given level of wealth, w, we deﬁne Ew ⊆ E the
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subset of entrepreneurs endowed with wealth w, and E(w) = |Ew| the corresponding
number of entrepreneurs. Investment lasts one period and delivers an overall R > 0




pH if q = H
pL if q = L
, (1.1)
with pH > pL. A fraction λ of the population of entrepreneurs is of type H (safe)
and a fraction 1 − λ is of type L (risky). We assume pLR > (1 + r), which means
that both safe and risky entrepreneurs are worth ﬁnancing.
Ex ante, entrepreneurs’ type is private information and so is information about
wealth. In other words, individual wealth is not observable ex ante. However,
entrepreneurs can credibly disclose information about its true value at zero cost if
they want to. Ex post, in the event of default, wealth is observable and veriﬁable.
Finally, we assume that the value of an amount of entrepreneurial wealth w to the
lender is βw, with β < 1. Hence, liquidating wealth to pay for debt is ineﬃcient.
1.4.1 Contracts, sorting condition and signaling role of collateral
Following Besanko and Thakor (1987), we deﬁne a lending contract, C, as a triplet,
(RL, C, π), where RL is the cost of credit, C is the amount of collateral, and π is the
probability to be ﬁnanced.
Given a contract C = (RL, C, π), and a level of exemption η, the value of en-
trepreneurial wealth that the lender is entitled to in the case of default – which we
refer to as real guarantees – is given by: 2
G = min(max(w − η, C),max(RL
β
, C)). (1.2)
It is important to note that, other things equal, G is weakly increasing in C, and
decreasing in η.
2We are assuming that, in the event of default, non-collateralized entrepreneurs’ assets are liquidated
up to RL/β – that is up to the value of debt at date 1, RL.
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Sorting condition. The expected payoﬀ for an entrepreneur of type q signing a
generic contract, C is, pq(R − RL) − (1 − pq)G. Let C1 and C2 two contracts with
π1 = π2 = 1, C1 > C2 and RL,1 < RL,2 such that G1 > G2. Note that C1 > C2
implies G1 > G2, if η is suﬃciently high and β is suﬃciently low, relative to the
other parameters’ values. Then, if
pL(R−RL,1)− (1− pL)G1 ≥ pL(R−RL,2)− (1− pL)G2, (1.3)
pH(R−RL,1)− (1− pH)G1 > pH(R−RL,2)− (1− pH)G2, (1.4)
holds. This follows directly from pH > pL. That is whenever entrepreneurs of
type L prefer the contract characterized by more real guarantees, entrepreneurs of
type H strictly prefer such contract. This implies, in principle, that entrepreneurs
of type H could signal their type by self-selecting into a contract characterized
by a level of guarantees suﬃciently high. In turns, since guarantees are a weakly
increasing function of collateral, this means that collateral has a potential role as
sorting/signaling device.
Signaling role of collateral as a function of exemption, η. The eﬀectiveness of
collateral as a signaling/sorting mechanism depends upon the level of exemption,
η. Under no exemption, i.e. if η = 0, independently of whether they post collateral
or not, entrepreneurs’ wealth is liquidated in the event of default. Hence, posting
collateral does not provide any meaningful signal. In the opposite extreme case of
unlimited exemption, i.e. if η → ∞, entrepreneurs’ wealth is liquidated in the event
of default if and only if they post it as collateral. Hence, the opportunity cost of
posting collateral increases with exemption. But then, since such cost of capital is
type dependent, this implies that the signaling power of collateral is enhanced.
1.4.2 Equilibrium analysis
The sequence of actions is as follows:
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Stage 0: Entrepreneurs and lenders meet in the credit market. Lenders simultane-
ously oﬀer credit contracts; Entrepreneurs decide whether to disclose informa-
tion about their wealth or not,3 whether to demand credit or not, and under
which contract;
Stage 1: Contracts are signed (if any), and payoﬀs are realized.
We focus on symmetric Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPBE) in pure strategies.
We deﬁne an equilibrium as set of strategies for entrepreneurs and lenders, such that:
1. Lenders and entrepreneurs’ strategies constitute best replies at all stages given,
other agents’ strategies, and the belief function;
2. The belief function is consistent with agents’ strategies;
3. Lenders’ make zero proﬁts.
We characterize the set of equilibrium contracts in two steps. First, we consider
the simple case in which all borrowers have the same level of wealth w. Then we
generalize the result to any borrower’s wealth distribution.
Borrowers homogeneous with respect to wealth, w
For convenience, let us re-deﬁne contracts, in terms of guarantees, G, rather than
collateral, C.4 We will characterize the equilibrium in the general case in which
exemption is strictly positive, η > 0, and then brieﬂy characterize the equilibrium
in the special case in which η = 0. We start our equilibrium analysis with two
preliminary results.
1. In any equilibrium, lenders must be making zero proﬁts. Consider an equilib-
rium in which lenders oﬀer CL ≡ (RLL, GL, πL), and CH ≡ (RHL , GH , πH) to risky
and safe borrowers respectively, such that those lenders who are able to lend
make positive proﬁts.5 Since we assume E < L, there will be lenders not able
3Another way of saying it is that banks decide whether to ask entrepreneurs to disclose information by
oﬀering contracts that require entrepreneurs to do so, or not.
4Once we derive the equilibrium contracts in terms of G, we can recover the equilibrium values of C.
5Note that in a pooling equilibrium, CL = CH holds.
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to lend, who make zero proﬁts. Then, one of these lenders could deviate and
oﬀer a contract CL′ , characterized by a cost of credit, RL′L = RLL − . Clearly,
borrowers of type L strictly prefer this contract compared to the equilibrium
ones. Moreover, since  can be chosen arbitrarily close to zero, proﬁts of the
deviating lender will be strictly positive. Hence, the described deviation is
proﬁtable, which destroys the equilibrium. Hence, in any equilibrium, lenders
who are oﬀering a contract CL must be making zero proﬁts. This also implies
that in any separating equilibrium, where CL = CH , lenders must be making
zero proﬁts on each of the equilibrium contracts.
2. So long as η > 0, the standard result of models with competitive screening
applies according to which, no pooling equilibrium exists. Consider a candi-
date pooling equilibrium characterized by a contract CP = (RPL , GP , πP ). The
equilibrium contract satisﬁes lenders’ zero proﬁts’ condition:
Cp : pMRPL + (1− pM)βGP = 0 (1.5)
where pM ≡ λpH + (1− λ)pL. Suppose ﬁrst that the level of guarantees equals





L + ΔRL, and G
′ = C ′ = CP − ΔC where ΔRL = β(1 −
pL)/pLΔC+, so that such deviation will be always strictly proﬁtable to lenders
so long it attracts borrowers. Borrowers of type L strictly prefer a contract
characterized by a higher interest rate and a lower collateral compared to the
equilibrium contract CP so long as ΔRL ≤ (1−pL)pLΔC. It is then immediate
to verify that for  → 0+, the above deviation will attract at least borrowers of
type L, which destroys the candidate equilibrium. Suppose now that GP > CP .
In this case, a deviation characterized by a lower level of collateral has no eﬀect.
Consider, instead, a deviation, C ′ = (R′L, C ′, πM) where, R′L = RPL −ΔRL, and
C ′ = ΔC+GP where ΔRL = −β(1−pH)/pHΔC+, so that such deviation will
be always strictly proﬁtable to lenders so long it attracts borrowers of type H.
Borrowers of type H strictly prefer a contract characterized by a lower interest
rate and higher collateral compared to the equilibrium contract CP so long
as |ΔR| > (1 − pH)pHΔC. Diﬀerently, borrowers of type L will prefer the
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new contract if |ΔR| > (1 − pL)pLΔC. Given pL < pH , (1 − pL)pLΔC >
(1 − pH)pHΔC. It then follows that, for  → 0+, the above deviation will
attract only borrowers of type H, and it would be strictly proﬁtable for both
lenders and borrowers of type H, which destroys the equilibrium.
Given points 1-2 above, with no loss of generality, we focus on separating equilibria
(SE), which by deﬁnition, are equilibria where safe types separate from risky types.
We disregard the existence problem and focus on equilibrium characterization.6 We
analyze ﬁrst the special case in which all borrowers are homogeneous in wealth, w,
and information about individual wealth is common knowledge. Then, we deal with
the more general case in which borrowers are heterogeneous with respect to wealth,
and information about individual wealth is private albeit disclosable at no cost.
Consider a candidate SE equilibrium where lenders oﬀer contracts, CH = (RHL , GH , πH)
and CL = (RLL, GL, πL), such that, rich and safe self-select into contract CH and risky
select into contract CL. These contracts should satisfy the following constraints:
1. Borrowers’ incentive compatibility constraints
(ICCH) : πH [pH(R−RHL )−(1−pH)GH ] ≥ πL[pH(R−RLL)−(1−pH)GL], (1.6)
(ICCL) : πL[pL(R−RLL)− (1−pL)GL] ≥ πH [pL(R−RHL )− (1−pL)GH ]; (1.7)
2. Feasibility constraints
Gi ≤ w, (1.8)
Gi ≥ max(w − η, 0), (1.9)
πi ≤ 1 (1.10)
πi ≥ 0 (1.11)
with i = L,H;
6The standard argument applies according to which there is no guarantee that a competitive equilib-
rium exists. Having said that, there exist parameter conﬁgurations such that the equilibrium exist. We
characterize the unique equilibrium (outcome) under parameter conﬁgurations that guarantee existence.
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3. Borrowers’ participation constraints:
pH(R−RHL )− (1− pH)GH ≥ 0, (1.12)
pL(R−RLL)− (1− pL)GL ≥ 0; (1.13)
4. Lenders’ zero-proﬁts constraints:
pHR
H














Our ﬁrst observation is that –since liquidation of borrowers’ asset is an ineﬃcient
way of corresponding cash ﬂows to lenders, due to β < 1 – in any equilibrium, the
level of guarantees played by risky types should be minimum. Accordingly, in any
SE, C∗L ≤ min(w − η,RL/β) must hold (no distortion at the bottom), so that,




and R∗L is determined accordingly by the zero proﬁt constraint, (1.15).
7 In order to
prove that C∗L ≤ min(w − η,RL/β) must hold, consider a candidate SE such that
the contract designed for L-type entrepreneurs is characterized by CL > max(w −
η,RL/β) , so that GL= CL. Consider a deviation to a contract such that G
′ =
C ′ = CL − ΔC and R′ = RL + ΔR, where ΔR = β(1 − pL)/pLΔC + . It is
immediate to verify that such contract will be strictly proﬁtable to lenders if it can
attract any borrower. In fact, L-type borrower would strictly prefer this contract if
ΔR ≤ (1 − pL)pLΔC. This condition is satisﬁed for  → 0+, so that there exist a
strictly proﬁtable deviation, which destroys the equilibrium.






L and substituting for R
H
L using (1.14), the
values of πH and GH associated with the optimal contract for safe types, and the
value of πL associated with the optimal contract for risky types solve
7If RL = (1 + r)/β the loan is safe as the borrower has enough non-exempt wealth to repay the loan
even in the event of default.
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subject to the constraints 1-4. The Lagrangean associated with the problem is
L =λ{πH [pHR− (1 + r)− (1− pH)(1− β)GH}+
+(1− λ){πL[pL(R−RL∗L )− (1− pL)G∗L]}+ w
+τH(1− πH) + τL(1− πL) + γHπH + γLπL + θH(w −GH) + δH(GH −max(w − η, 0))
+μH{πH [pHR− (1 + r)− (1− pH)(1− β)GH ]− πL[pH(R−RL∗L )− (1− pH)G∗L]}
+μL{πL[pL(R−RL∗L )− (1− pL)G∗L]− πH [pL(R− (1 + r) +
pL
pH
(1− pH)βGH − (1− pL)GH ]},
(1.18)




= (1− λ)[pL(R−RL∗L )− (1− pL)G∗L] + μL[pL(R−RL∗L )− (1− pL)G∗L]
(1.19)
−μH [pH(R−RL∗L )− (1− pH)G∗L] + γL − τL = 0,
∂L
∂πH
= λ{pHR− (1 + r)− (1− pH)(1− β)GH}+ μH [pHR− (1 + r)− (1− pH)(1− β)GH ]
(1.20)
μL[pL(R− (1 + r) + pL
pH
(1− pH)βGH − (1− pL)GH ] + γH − τH = 0,
∂L
∂GH
= −πH(μH + λ)(1− pH)(1− β)− πHμL[ pL
pH
(1− pH)β − (1− pL)] + θH − δH = 0.
(1.21)
We solve for the optimal contracts under two cases: that in which borrowers are
rich in the sense that they are endowed with a level of wealth that exceeds the
level of guarantees associated with the optimal contract for type-H borrowers; and
that in which they are poor in the sense that wealth constraint is binding for those
borrowers who self-select into the contract designed for type-H borrowers.
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Case a: Sorting rich and safe borrowers from risky one. Consider ﬁrst the
case in which G∗H ≤ w is not binding. We solve the maximization problem under the
hypothesis that G∗H ∈ (w,max(w−η, 0)) and then verify the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for that to hold. Given G∗H ∈ (0, w), δH = θH = 0. Accordingly, it follows
from the FOC relative to GH that, μL > 0,
8 which means that the ICCL is binding,








It is easy to verify that, if the ICCL is binding, then the ICCH is slack, so that
μH = 0 holds. In turns, the FOC relative to the choice of πL reduces to:
(1− λ+ μL)[pL(R−RL∗L )− (1− pL)G∗L + w] + γL − τL ≥ 0. (1.23)
It can be immediately veriﬁed that the only possibility is τL = 1 , which means
π∗L = 1. As for π
∗
H , it follows directly from the relevant FOC that the only possibility


















where easy to verify that G∗H > G
∗
L holds, so long as G
∗




10 Note that G∗H > min(w − η, 0), directly implies C∗H = G∗H >
C∗L. Other things equal, there will be always values of w such G
∗




(1− pH)β − (1− pL)] is positive and πH(μH + λ)(1− pH)(1− β) is strictly negative so that, if
θH = θL = 0, μL > 0 must follow.
9This is also conﬁrmed if we substitute for G∗H using (1.22) in the expression for safe borrowers to
obtain,
πH(pHR− (1 + r))− πH(1− pH)(1− β)
(1 + r)( pH
pL





which is increasing in πH whenever safe borrowers are willing to demand credit.
10This follows directly from 1 + r > β.
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H < w, so that the identiﬁed solution is coherent with the starting
hypothesis that the constraint G∗H ≤ w were not binding.
Finally let us look at the participation constraints. Type i = H,L will apply for
credit if and only if
G∗i ≤
piR− (1 + r)
(1− pi)(1− β) = G
max
i (1.26)
There always exists parameter conﬁgurations such that the above constraints are
satisﬁed. In particular, other things equal, such constraints are always satisﬁed for
R big enough.
Case b: Sorting poor and safe borrowers from risky ones. Consider now the
case in which G∗H > w so that the constraint GH ≤ w will be binding at the optimal
contract. In this case, the optimal values of GH and GL, which we call G
∗∗
H , and G
∗∗
L
respectively, satisfy G∗∗H = C
∗∗






L = min(w − η, 1+rβ ) hold,
with C∗∗L = C
∗
L ≤ G∗L.
We derive the other elements of the optimal contracts under the assumption that
that ICCH is not binding, so that μH = 0, and then verify that indeed the ICCH is
not binding. Given μH = 0, the FOC relative to the choice of πL implies π
∗
L = 1 as




H < 1, otherwise the ICCL would be
violated. Furthermore, the FOC relative to the choice of πH implies that the ICCL





pLR− (1 + r)− (1− pL)G∗L]
[pLR− pLpH (1 + r) +
pL
pH
(1− pH)βw − (1− pL)w] (1.27)
where it is immediate to verify that π∗∗H < 1.
Characterization of the equilibrium. We are now able to characterize the equi-
librium for the case in which borrowers are homogeneous in wealth. Risky borrow-
ers (independently of whether they are rich or poor) self-select into the contract
C∗L = {RL∗L , C∗L, 1}, with C∗L ≤ G∗L = min(w − η, 1+rβ ), so that they are always able
to borrow and are never rationed; safe and rich borrowers self-select into the loan
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contract C∗H = {RH∗L , C∗H , π∗H}, where π∗H = 1, and C∗H > C∗L, and, RH∗L < RL∗L ; and,
ﬁnally safe borrowers self-select into the loan contract, C∗∗H = {RH∗∗L , w, π∗∗H }, with
π∗∗H < 1 if they are poor.
Generalization to any wealth distribution
Let us now extend the above characterization to the case in which borrowers are
heterogeneous with respect to pledgeable wealth w ∈ [0, w] they are endowed with,
and information about individual wealth is private and disclosable at no cost. The
key point here is to show that in any SE both risky and safe borrowers have the
incentive to disclose their wealth. This is crucial, because then banks can sort
risky and safe borrowers conditional on wealth so that the structure of the optimal
contracts derived above will hold in equilibrium, as borrowers with wealth w will
have access only to contracts speciﬁed for borrowers with that level of wealth.
Let us ﬁrst analyze the incentives that safe borrowers have to disclose their
wealth. In any SE, the ICC of borrowers of type L must be satisﬁed as strict
equality. Otherwise, lenders can make extra proﬁts by oﬀering a new contract to
safe borrowers, characterized by slightly lower interest rate or guarantees or both.
Hence,
πL[pL(R−RLL)− (1− pL)GL] ≥ πH [pL(R−RHL )− (1− pL)GH ]; (1.28)
must hold for any risky borrower. We note that the LHS of the above constraint is
decreasing in GL. As GL is increasing in w so long as w − η ≤ (1 + r)/β, for any
borrower of type H, are not disclosing their wealth, the contract oﬀered to them
must satisfy,
πL[pL(R−RLL)−(1−pL)min(w−η, (1+r)/β] ≥ πH [pL(R−RHL )−(1−pL)GH ]; (1.29)
Crucially, for a risky borrower with wealth, w1, such that GL,1 = min(w1 −
η, (1 + r)/β) < min(w − η, (1 + r)/β the above constraint is satisﬁed as a strict
inequality. Hence, borrowers of type H with the same level of wealth equal to w1,
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have the incentive to disclose their wealth because in that case they can be oﬀered
a contract conditional on the wealth level, which needs to satisfy only the ICCL for
risky borrowers endowed with that level of wealth, that is
πL[pL(R−RLL)− (1− pL)(w1 − η) ≥ πH [pL(R−RHL )− (1− pL)GH ]; (1.30)
which is less strict than the above.
In other words, given a SE in which safe borrowers with wealth w such that
w − η < (1 + r)/β are not disclosing their wealth, lenders have the incentive to
propose contracts that require safe borrowers to disclose their wealth, as by doing
so they can make extra proﬁts and surely attract borrowers. Let us now turn to
the incentives of risky borrowers to disclose their wealth. Note that, the above
argument does not hold for safe borrowers endowed with levels of wealth such that
w − η ≥ (1 + r)/β. However, whether these borrowers disclose their wealth or not
does not make a diﬀerence in terms of the equilibrium outcome.
Consider now incentives of risky borrowers. Consider a candidate equilibrium
characterized by the fact that there is a non-empty subset E ′ of entrepreneurs
heterogeneous with respect to wealth who are not disclosing their wealth, w, for
whom w − η > C and C < RL/β. μ(w|e ∈ E ′) will be the equilibrium ex-
pected value of wealth for an entrepreneur who is not disclosing her wealth, with,
μ(w|e ∈ E ′) < sup(w(E ′)), where sup(w(E ′)) is the level of wealth of the richest en-
trepreneur who is not disclosing her wealth. In equilibrium, lenders should breakeven
in expected terms, given the information available. Hence, for each borrower e with
e ∈ E ′, the equilibrium contract satisﬁes,
pHR
′
L + (1− pH)βG′ = 1 + r (1.31)
where, G′ = min(μ(w|e ∈ E ′) − η, RL
β
). It is then immediate to verify that if
disclosing her wealth, the richest entrepreneur who is not disclosing it, would be
better oﬀ by doing so, she will increase the level of expected guarantees she is
oﬀering the lenders, thereby reducing the cost of credit, which destroys the candidate
equilibrium.11
11By doing so, she will increase the level of expected guarantees she is oﬀering the lenders to G′′ =
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L ≡ min(w − η, RLβ ) the level of guarantees associated with the equi-
librium contract for the risky and wealthiest borrowers who are posting collateral,
C
∗
L ≤ w − η. Note that, according to the above discussion, these entrepreneurs are




(1 + r)( pL
pH





deﬁnes the level of real guarantees that a safe borrower needs to oﬀer in order to
self-select into the debt contract characterized by π∗H = 1. Then, all safe borrowers
with wealth w < G
∗
H cannot self-select into the debt contract characterized by G
∗
H .
These borrowers will post collateral C∗∗H = w, thereby oﬀering guarantees G
∗∗
H = w
(Note that these entrepreneurs might disclose their wealth or not). These borrowers
will be rationed with positive probability 1−π∗∗H . All risky borrowers will self-select
into contracts characterized by collateral C∗L ≤ w − η, and guarantees equal to
G∗L = min(w − η,RL/β), and will never be rationed (note that these borrowers will
be disclosing their wealth).


















The empirical implication of the adverse selection model are as follows.
i. Exemption, collateral and cost of credit Consider two borrowers, one risky
and one safe, homogeneous in wealth, w. Suppose borrowers are rich, in the sense
that w > G∗H . For a given level of exemption, η, the diﬀerence in the cost of credit














sup(w(E ′))−η, thereby reducing the cost of credit. Given that, ex post, her true wealth will be observable
and veriﬁable anyway, the advantage of disclosing the information ex ante is clear.
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where G∗L = min(w − η,RL∗L /β).
































We know that G∗L = min(w − η,RL∗L /β) is generally a weakly decreasing function
of exemption, that is dG∗L/dη ≤ 0. Furthermore, G∗L is strictly decreasing η for
suﬃciently high levels of η. Therefore, given that marginal eﬀect of G∗L on ΔRL is
negative, we can conclude that the interest rate diﬀerential conditional on posting
collateral, goes up (down) as the level of exemption goes up (down). In other words,
the eﬀect of collateral on the interest rate goes up with the level of exemption.













We note that as the level of exemption decreases (increase), this will eventually
results in an increase (reduction) of the level of guarantees oﬀered by risky borrowers,
G∗L = min(w−η, RLβ ), while the guarantees oﬀered by safe borrowers stay unchanged.
This will reduce (increase) the cost of credit faced by risky borrowers compared to
safe and poor borrowers. Hence, also for safe and poor borrowers, the eﬀect of
posting collateral on the cost of credit they face, compared to risky borrowers,
increases with the level of exemption.
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ii. Exemption, collateral, and access to credit Notably as the level of exemption
decreases the amount of collateral that safe borrowers need to post in order to be
not rationed increases. Hence, given a wealth distribution, more safe borrowers fall
in the poor category, and will be rationed. Hence, we should observe a negative
correlation between exemption level and rationing. Furthermore a reduction of the
level of exemption might discourage entrepreneurs from applying for credit. This
eﬀect reinforces the conclusion that a reduction in exemption should result in more
credit rationing.
Summarizing,
i. Other things equal, for a given level of exemption, the decision to post collateral
results in a lower cost of credit
ii. The reduction in the interest rate associated to the decision to post collateral
goes up with exemption
iii. The fraction of rationed individuals over total number of individuals demanding
credit goes down with exemption (The probability of a safe borrower being
rationed goes down with exemption).
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1.5 Empirical analysis
We focus on the following three predictions stemming from the model
i. A wealth eﬀect: we should observe a reduction of loan rate and less rationing
the richer is the borrower;
ii. a collateral eﬀect: for borrowers posting collateral we should observe a reduction
of loan rate and an increase in rationing. Posting collateral, conditional on
wealth, is associated with some rationing, as safe and poor borrowers have a
probability to receive a loan less than one. Hence, this eﬀect should be smaller
for rich borrowers;
iii. exemption eﬀect: a higher level of exemption decreases the amount of collateral
that safe and poor borrowers need to post to signal themselves. Hence, with
high exemption we should observe a lower fraction of rationed borrowers that
post collateral.
1.5.1 Data
The data in this paper come from the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF),
which has been conducted in 2004-2005 for the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. The public data set provides information for a sample of 4240
ﬁrms, selected from the target population of all for-proﬁt, non-ﬁnancial, non-farm,
non-subsidiary business enterprises that had fewer than 500 employees and were in
operation as of year-end 2003 and on the date of the interview. The Survey col-
lected information on the availability and use of credit and other ﬁnancial services
along with information on ﬁrm demographic characteristics for up to three individ-
ual owners, and other information on the number of workers, organizational form,
location, credit history, income statement and balance sheet data. The survey asks
the respondents to provide information whether the ﬁrm applied for credit during
the last three years (from 2001 to 2003) and, in that case, whether the recent loan
applications were always denied, always approved or sometimes approved. Consis-
tently with our model, in which all ﬁrms are credit worth, we consider ﬁrms always
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or sometimes approved. We exclude the ﬁrms always denied because the rejection
can be considered as an indicator of non-credit worthiness. The sample size reduces
to 1761 credit worth ﬁrms, 96% of which have been always ﬁnanced. For all the
ﬁrm that in the same period have been always or sometimes ﬁnanced the survey
provides some information on the most recent loan contract. In particular, we have
information on the interest rate applied to the loan and whether the ﬁrm had to
post some collateral to secure the loan. The dataset does not provide information
on the amount of collateral posted. From the data we also compute the percentage
of rationing. This percentage is the ratio between the number of ﬁrms that have
been sometimes rationed and the creditworthy ﬁrms. According to the model these
three measures deﬁne the loan contract.
We also include in the dataset the level of bankruptcy homestead and personal
property exemptions according to ﬁrm geographical location. Exemption levels vary
across states, but the public version of the SSBF reports ﬁrm location only for nine
census divisions (New England; Middle Atlantic; East North Central; West North
Central; South Atlantic; East South Central; West South Central; Mountain; Pa-
ciﬁc). Thus, we assign to each ﬁrm the average level of exemption of its census
division. In the states in which the exemption is unlimited we set it to the average
dollar value of ﬁrms’ assets in the sample. We consider two level of exemption: high
exemption for ﬁrms in a census division in which average exemption is above the
median value and low exemption otherwise.
Firm wealth is measured by ﬁrm’s total asset. We also consider two level of wealth:
high asset if asset is above the median value and low asset group otherwise.
Thus, we can identify four groups of ﬁrms according to their wealth and level of
exemption. The descriptive statistics of the elements of the loan contract are dis-
played in table 1.1, for the whole sample and the groups.
We observe the following pattern in the data.
1. High asset ﬁrms pay a lower cost of capital and are less rationed. The loan
rate is 1.5 percentage points lower and the fraction of rationed ﬁrms is 3.8%
lower for high asset ﬁrms compared to those in the low asset group.
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2. Posting collateral reduces the cost of capital. In the whole sample, for ﬁrms
that post collateral loan rate is 0.7% lower, while the fraction of rationed ﬁrms
is 1.5% higher.
3. The eﬀect of posting collateral on the cost of capital depends on wealth: Low
asset ﬁrms have a cost of capital 0.9% lower if they post collateral, while for
high asset the reduction in the cost of capital for posting collateral is much
smaller (0.04%).
4. Posting collateral increases rationing. The fraction of rationed ﬁrms increases
by 1.5% if ﬁrms post collateral.
5. The eﬀect of posting collateral on rationing also depends on wealth. In the
group of low asset ﬁrms, the fraction of those rationed is 4.4% higher for
ﬁrm posting collateral, while in the high asset group there is no diﬀerence in
rationing depending on collateral.
6. Rationing is higher in states with high exemption. The fraction of rationed
ﬁrms goes from 3.4% to 5% moving from low to high exemption areas. The
increase in rationing with exemption is observed for both level of wealth, al-
though for the rich this eﬀect is less evident.
7. However, if ﬁrms post collateral the fraction of those rationed reduces by 1.1%
moving from low to high exemption levels. This eﬀect is larger (-1.9%) for the
low asset ﬁrms compared to those with high asset (-0.5%).
When considered independently posting collateral and higher level of exemption are
associated with more rationing. On the contrary and consistently with our model,
the combination of the two leads to less rationing, and this eﬀect is reinforced the
lower is the ﬁrm asset.
1.5.2 Multivariate analysis
To further analyze the relationship between collateral and exemption and to spot-
light the signaling content of collateral we ﬁrst estimate a single equation model,
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one for the bank’s decision to ﬁnance a ﬁrm and another for the loan rate. We put
aside for the moment the possible simultaneity among the elements of the contract,
i.e. posting collateral, the bank’s decision to ﬁnance the ﬁrm and the cost of credit.
We consider this issue later.
Exemption, collateral and wealth eﬀect on rationing
The probability to access credit for ﬁrm i is given by the following equation:
πi = α
′
1Zi + α2ηi + α3Ci + α4Ciηi + α5RLi + u1,i (1.39)
where π takes on two values: 1 if the ﬁrm is always ﬁnanced, 0 if it is sometimes
rationed; Zi is a set of controls that aﬀect bank’s decision to ﬁnance; α1 is a vector
of parameters; α2, α3, α4 are parameters; ηi is the level of exemption for ﬁrm i; Ci
is a dummy equal one if ﬁrm i post collateral; RLi is the interest rate on the loan
and the error term u1 is ∼ N(0, σ1).
We estimate the probability that πi = 1 with standard probit.
As explained before, the dummy for collateral is expected to be negatively correlated
with the probability to receive a loan. In the estimation we capture the signaling
eﬀect of collateral through the interaction term between exemption level and the
dummy for posting collateral. According to the theoretical model an increase in ex-
emption level reduces the value of guarantees necessary for safe borrowers to signal
themselves, increasing the number of safe borrowers that can access credit, i.e. in-
creasing the probability to receive a loan. Hence, exemption aﬀects the probability
to receive a loan only for safe and poor borrowers able to signal with collateral. We
use exemption as identiﬁcation strategy of the signaling content of collateral, which
emerges if we observe that giving collateral in areas with high exemption counter-
balances the overall negative correlation between collateral and the probability to
receive a loan.
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Exemption, collateral and wealth eﬀect on the cost of credit
The cost of credit is determined according to the following equation:
RLi = β
′
1X1,i + β2ηi + β3Ci + β4Ciηi + u2,i (1.40)
where X1 is a set of controls, β1 is a vector of parameters, β2, β3, β4 are pa-
rameters, and the error term u2,i is ∼ N(0, σ2). We estimate the equation of loan
rate by OLS. Posting collateral should have a negative eﬀect on the cost of credit.
We identify the signaling value of collateral including the interaction term between
exemption and the dummy posting collateral. According to the theoretical model
the loan rate increases with exemption only for the risky borrowers. In line with this
ﬁnding we expect to observe a positive relationship between loan rate and exemp-
tion, but a negative sign for β4 if posting collateral induces an additional reduction
of loan rate as exemption increases.
Regressors
We include some controls for ﬁrm-bank relationship and various ﬁrm, entrepreneur
and loan characteristics as control variables in the equation of the ﬁnancing decision
and the equation of the interest rate.
Sorensen and Chang (2006) provide wide evidence of the positive relationship
between entrepreneur experience and ﬁrm proﬁt. To catch the managing experience
eﬀect we include the number of years of the principal owner’s managing experience.
We expect a negative eﬀect on interest rate as we expect that a greater experience
is positively correlated to higher proﬁt and hence generating a higher probability of
success for the venture.
Belonging to a minority group has been found to reduce the probability of ob-
taining a loan (Cavalluzo and Wolken, 2005; Berkowitz and White, 2002), while
Cerqueiro and Penas (2011) found evidence that owners belonging to a minority
group rely more heavily on their own funds to ﬁnance a start up. We include two
dummies: the ﬁrst is equal one if the principal owner is black, the other is equal
one if the owner belongs to other minority groups (asian, hispanic, asian paciﬁc, na-
tive american). We include also a dummy indicating whether the owner is female, to
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verify possible discrimination eﬀects on the loan price. Firm’s proprietorship charac-
teristic may have some eﬀect on credit availability and loan contract due to diﬀerent
agency costs compared to those of non-family owned ﬁrms. Anderson et al (2003)
argue that debt holders often establish informed relationships with managers, and
the family’s presence may foster these relationships to build over successive gen-
erations. Niskanen et al (2010) found some evidence of less credit availability in
small Finnish ﬁrms when family ownership increases and evidence of less collateral
requirement associated with managerial ownership. On the contrary no proprietor-
ship eﬀect on the loan interest rate has been found, suggesting the presence of more
relevant agency cost for family ownership.
Firm bank relationship can be represented by several variables, such as ﬁrm dis-
tance from the bank, the duration of in years of the relationship with the lender.
Local credit market characteristics may also have a role in explaining the loan pric-
ing decision. To consider possible bank local market power we include a dummy
equal one if the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman bank deposit index of local banking market
concentration is greater than 1800 (i.e. highly concentrated). Number of credit
applications in the previous three years may represent a proxy of the ﬁrm need for
ﬁnancial resources. Given other ﬁrm characteristics many or frequent applications
may signal the bank the existence of ﬁnancial distress or greater investment oppor-
tunities. Credit score can be used to signal quality to the bank and may have an
eﬀect on interest rate. To measure this eﬀect we include a dummy equal one if ﬁrm
credit score is in the top 25% of the distribution.
We also consider that the characteristics of the loan may have an impact on its
price. We take into account that the loan can be a line of credit, a mortgage or with
ﬁxed interest rate.
We include the logs of sales to account for dimensional eﬀects and a measure of
ﬁrm ﬁnancial structure, the ratio of debt on total asset, to catch for the impact of
leverage on the loan contract. Finally, ﬁrm wealth is proxied by ﬁrm asset.
In the equation of bank’s decision to ﬁnance the control variables are mainly
related to loan characteristics and ﬁrm-bank relationships. The amount of loan
granted on the total amount applied may positively aﬀect bank proﬁt and hence
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the bank willingness to ﬁnance. Higher loan maturity increases bank’s asset rigidity
and risk. We expect a negative impact on the decision to ﬁnance. A longer ﬁrm-
bank relationship improves the information ﬂow between lenders and borrowers. We
include the numbers of years of the relationship with the lender and we expect a
positive eﬀect on the probability to receive a loan. Past delinquencies may represent
a bad signal of ﬁrm trustworthiness. Thus, we expect a negative sign for the a
dummy equal one if the ﬁrm has a delinquency record. As in the loan rate equation,
we include ﬁrm’s credit score to proxy its credit quality. We also include a control
about ﬁrm capital structure. The ratio of debt on total asset is expected to have a
negative impact on the bank’s willingness to ﬁnance, because higher leverage may
reduce ﬁrm ability to repay. Firm wealth, as proxied by ﬁrm asset, is expected
to have a positive eﬀect in the ﬁnancing decision equation. Finally, we include a
dummy equal one if the ﬁrm has limited liability to catch possible bank’s constraints
to seize owners’ wealth in the event of default.
Results
In table 1.2 the results of the OLS estimation for the cost of credit (RL) are displayed.
The sample of 1761 ﬁrms that received a loan during the period of the survey, reduces
to 1691 observations, due to missing values. In line with the theoretical model we
observe that as exemption increases the cost of credit increases, posting collateral
reduces it and the interaction term between posting collateral and exemption is
negative. We interpret this latter results as the evidence of the signaling value of
collateral. In fact, the reduction in the cost of credit for those posting collateral
is ampliﬁed increasing exemption. All control variables have the expected sign and
are signiﬁcant at least at 10% level except for the dummy indicating a female owner
and the number of applications. In table 1.3 we show the result of the estimation of
the probability to get credit. The result conﬁrms the predictions that:
1. posting collateral is associated with a lower probability to get credit;
2. there is a negligible overall eﬀect of exemption on credit rationing;
3. the interaction term between posting collateral and exemption is positive.
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We observe that for borrowers posting collateral an increase of exemption reduces
rationing. We can interpret this result as the evidence of signaling value of collateral.
1.5.3 Simultaneity
In the model the equilibrium loan contracts are triplet of elements, the cost of credit,
the amount of collateral and the probability to be ﬁnanced, which are simultaneously
determined. This simultaneity should be appropriately considered in the estimation.
In addition, the contract stems from a selection process in which ﬁrms that need
credit can be either denied the loan, discouraged from applying or are ﬁnanced by
the bank. For the moment we put aside the selectivity bias that can arise from this
selection process.
We address the simultaneity issue as described below. From the structural equa-
tion of the model we know that there is a biunivocal relation between the cost of
credit and the amount of guarantees. That is, the cost of credit is aﬀected by the
guarantees an entrepreneur is able to post as collateral and the amount of guaran-
tees is aﬀected by the cost of credit. In addition, the cost of credit and the amount
of guarantees are exogenous with respect to the probability to access credit. Hence,
to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates we need to estimate a system of two
equation for the cost of credit as a function of the guarantees and the amount of
guarantees as a function of the cost of credit. This estimation is constrained by the
available data. The level of collateral is an unobserved continuos variable, while the
observed variable is the dichotomous dummy equal one if the ﬁrm decides to post
and actually posts collateral. Once a type H borrower decides to post collateral,
the amount she posts determines the probability to access credit, and this amount
is aﬀected by the cost of credit. If she posts a signiﬁcant amount the borrower is
ﬁnanced with probability one. Thus, in the data we try to capture the relation-
ship between the cost of credit and collateral taking into account that the cost of
credit aﬀects the fraction of ﬁrms always ﬁnanced posting collateral. We combine
the observations of those posting collateral with those that are always ﬁnanced to
construct our collateral variable which is equal one when the ﬁrm posts collateral
and is always ﬁnanced. In this way we are imposing that the ones in the variable
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correspond to ﬁrms of type H that post a signiﬁcant amount of collateral. In other
words, this variable is a proxy of a high level of guarantees for type H borrowers.
According to the above argument we have a system of two simultaneous equations,
one for the interest rate and the other for the probability of posting collateral for
the always ﬁnanced ﬁrms. The estimation procedure and the identiﬁcation problem
that arises in such cases is discussed in Maddala and Lee (1976), and it is referred in
the literature as ’two stage probit least square’. To show the nature of the problem
we start from the following generic model:
RL∗ = γ1C∗ + β
′
1X1 + ε1 (1.41)
C∗ = γ2RL∗ + β
′
2X2 + ε2 (1.42)
in which RL∗ and C∗ are observed as follows:
RL = RL∗
C = 1 if C∗ > 0
C = 0 otherwise
and γ1 and γ2 are both diﬀerent form zero.
The simultaneous equation model arising from above is then:
RL∗i = γ1Ci + β
′
1X1,i + ε1,i (1.43)
Ci = γ2RL∗i + β
′
2X2,i + ε2,i (1.44)
where RL is a continuos endogenous variable (interest rate),
C is a dichotomous endogenous variable (dummy equal 1 if ﬁrm posted collateral
and is always ﬁnanced), which is observed only if C∗ > 0, i.e. if ﬁrm has posted a
signiﬁcant amount of collateral in order to be always ﬁnanced, and zero otherwise,
X1 and X2 are matrices of exogenous variables,
β1 and β2 are vectors of parameters of the exogenous variables,
γ1 and γ2 are the parameters of the endogenous variables,
ε1 and ε2 are the error term and i subscript denotes cross sections.
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We estimate the system of the two simultaneous equations in which RL is the
loan rate and C a dummy equal one if the ﬁrm posted collateral in order to be always
ﬁnanced, and a set X1 and X2 of control variables. The method of estimation for
the model and the routine used to implement a two stage probit least square are
presented in Keshk (2003).
We expect the following eﬀects:
1. a negative eﬀect of collateral on loan rate;
2. this eﬀect is larger for ﬁrms in high exemption areas;
3. a negative eﬀect of loan rate on collateral, i.e. high level of guarantees.
In the second column of table 1.4 and 1.5 we report the estimation results of the
simultaneous equation model for the whole sample. We ﬁnd a negative relationship
between RLand C. Other things equal, posting collateral is associated with an
average reduction in the cost of credit by 46 base points. Consistently, a higher
interest rate is associated to a reduction of the signiﬁcant amount of collateral, as
measured by our proxy. Assuming that collateral is endogenous we do not to include
the interaction term between exemption and collateral in the estimation, that would
be endogenous by construction. In order to identify the signaling value of collateral,
we estimate the model dividing the sample in two subsamples, one including ﬁrms
located in groups of states with average homestead and personal property exemption
level below the mean (low exemption), and the other including ﬁrms located in group
of states with exemption level above the mean. In the last two columns of table 1.4
we report the results. The negative relationship between collateral and cost of credit
is signiﬁcantly higher (59 base points) in the group of the high exempt ﬁrms. This
oﬀers further support to the model, and to the role of collateral as signal device.
1.6 Conclusions
Under chapter 7, bankrupt entrepreneurs beneﬁt from a fresh start opportunity
to the extent that they keep “uncollateralized” assets exempted from liquidation
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according to the exemption levels set by the law of the State in which the en-
trepreneurs operate. This, of course, at the expenses of creditors. However, ex ante,
entrepreneurs could undo the eﬀects of exemption by posting enough collateral. We
analyze the eﬀects of bankruptcy exemption in a competitive credit market charac-
terized by adverse selection. Diﬀerently from the existing literature, we explicitly
allow for the fact that borrowers can undo the eﬀects of bankruptcy exemption by
posting collateral. We ﬁnd that: (i) for a given level of exemption, borrowers posting
collateral face a lower cost of credit than those who do not post collateral, and; (ii)
this eﬀect is stronger the higher is the level of exemption; (iii) exemption has either
no eﬀect on credit rationing or reduces it. We test the simultaneous relationship
between the decision to post collateral and the cost of credit in a sample of US small
businesses using 2003 SSBF data. The empirical analysis support the predictions of
the theoretical model.
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Table 1.2: Estimation results : Cost of credit
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Homestead and personal property exemption ($) 0.0000000826∗ (0.000000048)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm posted collateral -0.31451∗∗∗ (0.06500)
Interaction term between dummy collateral and exemption levels -0.000000245∗∗∗ (0.000000065)
Dummy=1 if Fixed interest rate 0.94483∗∗∗ (0.05912)
Dummy=1 if lending was a new line of credit -0.16645∗∗ (0.07423)
Dummy=1 if lending was a mortgage 0.16972∗ (0.09571)
Banking market concentration: Dummy=1 if Herﬁndahl index> 1800 0.23343∗∗∗ (0.05356)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm’s Credit score is top 25% -0.11390∗∗ (0.05567)
Owner managing experience (n. of years) -0.01521∗∗∗ (0.00268)
Dummy=1 if Owner is black 0.89743∗∗∗ (0.22360)
Dummy=1 if Owner belongs to an ethnic minority other than black 0.83107∗∗∗ (0.10711)
Dummy=1 if Owner is female -0.03713 (0.07517)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm is family owned -0.27228∗∗∗ (0.06694)
Number of credit applications 0.01481 (0.01067)
Years of ﬁrm bank relationship -0.00875∗∗∗ (0.00258)
Distance of ﬁrm from bank (miles) 0.00115∗∗∗ (0.00039)
Natural log of total sales -0.32263∗∗∗ (0.01659)
Debt on total asset 0.02518∗∗∗ (0.00703)





Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 1.3: Probability to access credit
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Homestead and personal property exemption ($) -0.0000000097∗∗∗ (0.0000000019)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm posted collateral -0.01407∗∗∗ (0.00296)
Interest rate on loan (%) -0.00236∗∗∗ (0.00042)
Interaction term between dummy collateral and exemption levels 0.0000000096∗∗∗ (0.0000000025)
Loan original maturity (n. of months) -0.00005∗∗∗ (0.00002)
Amount granted over total applied 0.03178∗∗∗ (0.00555)
Years of ﬁrm bank relationship 0.00056∗∗∗ (0.00013)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm’s Credit score is top 25% 0.01182∗∗∗ (0.00257)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm has delinquency records -0.00721∗∗∗ (0.00101)
Debts on equity -0.00019∗∗ (0.00008)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm has limited liability 0.01099∗∗∗ (0.00363)
Total Asset - thousands of $ 0.00000017∗∗∗ (0.00000031)
N 1654
χ2(12) 361.94318
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 1.4: Simultaneous model: dependent variable RL
Whole sample Low exemption High exemption
Collateral -0.4686∗∗∗ -0.3463∗∗∗ -0.9314∗∗∗
(.1124) (.1267) (.3478)
Exemption -0.0000000715∗∗∗ - -
(0.0000000335) - -
N. obs 1596 1199 397
R2 0.16 0.14 0.24
F 81.12 60.02 37.80
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Two stages probit least square estimation (Maddala, Lee, 1976; Keshk, 2003)
List of controls: Dummy Fixed interest rate; Dummy new line of credit; Dummy mortgage; Dummy Credit score top
25%; Number of credit applications; Total sales; Banking market concentration; Owner managing experience (n. of
years); Dummy female owner; Dummy black owner; Dummy other minority owner; Years of ﬁrm bank relationship;
Distance of ﬁrm from bank; Debt on total asset; Dummy family owned, Firm Asset.
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Table 1.5: Simultaneous model: dependent variable C
Whole sample Low exemption High exemption
Loan Rate -0.2336∗∗∗ -0.2409∗∗∗ -0.1855∗∗∗
(.0170) (.0209) (.0279)
N. obs 1596 1119 397
LR chi2 (9) 636.02 458.22 195.30
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Two stages probit least square estimation (Maddala, Lee, 1976; Keshk, 2003)
List of controls: Dummy new line of credit; Dummy Credit score top 25%; Loan Maturity; Amount granted over
applied; Banking market concentration; Dummy limited liability; Dummy rationing sometimes; Dummy female
owner; Years of ﬁrm bank relationship; Dummy family owned.
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Discouraged borrowers and credit
rationing with moral hazard
2.1 Introduction
The literature on ﬁrm ﬁnancing argues that in equilibrium credit rationing occurs
because of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. This information
asymmetry may also cause that some potential borrowers do not apply for a loan
even if they need credit. For example, in the context of credit constrained house-
holds, Jappelli (1990) contemplates this category of potential borrowers and deﬁnes
them ”discouraged borrowers”. In general, discouragement in the credit market is
the phenomenon according which ﬁrms/households need credit but do not apply for
a loan because they feel they will be rejected. If the application for a loan involves
a positive cost to carry on the process, it may be the case that some borrowers with
low probability to be ﬁnanced do not apply because they feel they will be turned
down (Jappelli, 1990).
Discouragement becomes a relevant issue in the credit market especially when credit
worthy ﬁrms do not apply, even though they have a high probability to be ﬁnanced.
In such situation ﬁrms discouragement is important because discouraged ﬁrms must
be included in the accounting of credit rationing. In fact, in many cases the extent
of discouragement is larger than that of credit rationing, especially for small ﬁrms.
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For example using data from the ”1987 US National Survey of Small Business Fi-
nance” (NSSBF), Levenson and Willard (2000) ﬁnd that more than twice as many
small ﬁrms are ”discouraged” as are rejected for loans from ﬁnancial institution in
the United States, implying that discouragement is more important than credit re-
strictions of the Stiglitz-Weiss type. In the most recent wave of the NSSBF (2003)
there is evidence of the persistence of discouragement. We found that 14% of the
ﬁrms that need credit are discouraged from applying for a loan while 7% of the ﬁrms
that apply are denied. Thus, if we can consider discouraged ﬁrms as if they were
credit rationed, then the extent of credit rationing is bigger than what we observe
considering only rejection of ﬁrms that apply.
Our purpose is to identify the nature of discouraged ﬁrms and to investigate wether
these ﬁrms would be credit denied or not if they had applied. In order to empiri-
cally assess this issue we need to compare rationed and discouraged ﬁrms through
their probability of being ﬁnanced. For discouraged ﬁrms this probability is merely
theoretical because they never applied. We set a model of access to credit to show
that this comparison is feasible. We model a credit market with asymmetric infor-
mation and diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity among potential borrowers, assuming
that borrowers diﬀer in their application cost, their wealth and the liquidation value
of the asset they post as collateral. Given the equilibrium contracts oﬀered by the
banks, ﬁrms are able to predict their ﬁnancing possibility and so according to this
prediction they decide wether to apply or not. Positive costs of application and
uncertainty on the liquid value of the assets are crucial elements in the equilibrium
outcome, which identiﬁes three groups of non applicants: self-rationed entrepreneurs
with ex ante probability to be ﬁnanced equal zero; discouraged borrowers with prob-
ability to be ﬁnanced less than one that face suﬃciently high cost of application and
discouraged borrowers that would be ﬁnanced with certainty who face a higher cost
of application compared to the previous group. We conduct the empirical analysis
employing US data, to calculate the ex-ante probability to be ﬁnanced of discour-
aged ﬁrms in case they had applied and we compare this probability with that of
applicants, distinguishing between ﬁnanced and denied borrowers. We also test the
role and the extent of application cost in the decision to apply. We ﬁnd that de-
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nied and discouraged ﬁrms are similar in most of the owner and ﬁrm characteristics.
Moreover, discouraged ﬁrms have the same average probability of being ﬁnanced of
the ﬁrms that apply and are denied. Results show that discouraged ﬁrms with high
probability to be ﬁnanced may have given up the application because of higher cost
of application.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we review the literature on dis-
couragement. In the following section 2.3 the model is presented. The credit market
and the equilibrium analysis are discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5. Empirical impli-
cations are in section 2.6. The empirical analysis is developed in sections 2.7 and 2.8.
2.2 Review of the literature
The literature on discouraged borrower is closely related to that of credit rationing,
and in most of the paper discouragement is sought either as an extension of the
problem of credit rationing or as integral part of it.
Notion of discouraged borrowers. Jappelli (1990) introduces the notion
of discouraged borrower in the analysis of credit rationing in the housing loans
market in the U.S. He uses the degree of rejection of applicants for bank loans
as a measure of credit rationing. However, the author identiﬁes another group,
those who did not apply for loans because they perceived that their application
will be rejected by the bank. This group may be considered as credit rationed too
since they cannot be treated as having had no demand for loans. The exclusion of
this group may lead to biased results, because the self-selection of applicants may
induce banks to adapt screening rules that diﬀer from those that would prevail if
this group of borrowers were also to apply. Jappelli (1990) classiﬁes this group
as ”discouraged” borrowers and, together with the rejected group, considers them
as ”credit constrained” borrowers to distinguish them from the strict deﬁnition of
credit rationing.
Discouragement in small businesses. According to Levenson and Willard
(2000) discouragement depends on the time a ﬁrm has to wait to obtain ﬁnancing.
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If the ﬁrm receives the credit after waiting a period of length α and if α is very
small, then the ﬁrm is rationed for only a short period of time and the eﬀects of
credit rationing may be negligible. If α is large, then the delay to get access to credit
can aﬀect the ﬁrm’s ability to expand or even survive and ﬁnally some ﬁrms that
anticipate a large α may be discouraged from applying for credit. In this case, ﬁrms
do not ask for credit at all as they anticipate the refusals of banks for a rather long
period: they are self rationed. Adopting the deﬁnition of credit rationing by Jappelli
(1990), they use ”1987 NSSBF” data for investigating the small business sector in the
US. They calculate an upper bound for the probability of credit rationing including
the sample of discouraged ﬁrms among the ﬁrms that are credit denied. Given their
results and the impossibility to identify between denied ﬁrms not credit worthy
and ﬁrms properly rationed, they conclude that credit rationing is not a pervasive
phenomenon in the U.S. economy.
Latent demand for credit. Free et al. (2012) use UK survey data to study
the dimensions along which discouraged ﬁrms diﬀer from non-discouraged ﬁrms (i.e.
applicants). They conﬁrm the ﬁnding of Levenson and Willard (2000) according to
which businesses are around twice as likely to be discouraged from applying as to
have been rejected. The authors say that ”if the extent of discouragement is indeed
large, or signiﬁcantly larger than rejection, then addressing the fears of discouraged
borrowers may be a more appropriate means of intervention than traditional supply-
side mechanisms.” Their key issue is to analyze how characteristics of the ﬁrm, of
the entrepreneur and of the strategy inﬂuence borrowing decisions. They observe
that smaller ﬁrms, corporations, serial entrepreneurs, knowledge-intensive service
ﬁrms, non-family ﬁrms, ﬁrms without an established banking relationship and ﬁrms
pursuing cost-focussed strategies were all more likely to record discouragement.
Theory of discouraged borrower. Under the theoretical point of view, Kon
and Storey (2003) wonder about the signiﬁcance of ”discouragement”. Borrowing
the notion of discouragement from the consumer credit literature (e.g. Jappelli,
1990), the authors develop a theory of ”discouraged borrowers”. A discouraged
borrower is a good ﬁrm, requiring ﬁnance, that chooses not to apply to the bank
because it feels its application will be rejected. Their concern is about the extent
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of discouragement in an economy, which they argue depends on the screening error
of banks, the size of application costs and the extent to which banks interest rate
diﬀers from that charged by money lenders.
Quality of discouraged borrowers. Taking the notion of a discouraged bor-
rower originally formulated by Kon and Storey (2003), Han et al. (2009) test whether
discouragement is an eﬃcient self-rationing mechanism. Using data from the 1998
US NSSBF they ﬁnd that, after controlling for the characteristics of both the busi-
ness and the entrepreneur, riskier borrowers are more likely to be discouraged. More-
over, using the length of ﬁnancial relationship as a proxy for information quality they
ﬁnd that riskier borrowers are more likely to be discouraged. This ﬁnding suggests
that discouragement is an eﬃcient self-rationing mechanism.
2.3 The model
We examine a credit market with a large number of both entrepreneurs E and and
lenders L, where L
E
> 1. Both entrepreneurs and lenders are risk neutral.
Each entrepreneur has the opportunity to undertake a one-period project which
requires a ﬁxed amount of investment of size I. Each entrepreneur has an initial
amount of illiquid assets A ∈ R+ so that he cannot use them to ﬁnance the project.
In order to undertake the project, the entrepreneur has to apply for credit to a
bank and can use his own assets only as collateral to guarantee the loan. If the
entrepreneur undertakes the project, it can either succeed yelding R > 0 or fail
yelding 0. The probability of success p of the project depends on the eﬀort e exerted
by the entrepreneur which can be either high (H) or low (L). If the entrepreneur
misbehaves, i.e. if he exerts low eﬀort, he gets private beneﬁts B > 0 and the
probability that the project succeeds is equal to pL. If he behaves he gets zero
private beneﬁts and the probability of success is equal to pH , with pH > pL. We
assume that the project is feasible only in the absence of moral hazard, that is
pHR− I(1 + r) > 0 and pLR− I(1 + r) + B < 0.
Each lender is endowed with I units of ﬁnancial resources, meaning that each lender
can ﬁnance only one entrepreneur. The opportunity cost of the capital is r > 0.
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Lenders compete competitively in the sense that in equilibrium, the loan they grant
gives them zero proﬁt. We also assume that:
i. The application process is costly so that if the entrepreneur decides to apply
he knows that he will incur a cost of application c ∈ R+. The application cost
is the same regardless the bank the entrepreneur applies.
ii. Any amount of entrepreneurial asset A worths for the lender only βA where
β < 1 with β = {β, β} ∼ U .
The knowledge on β is asymmetric in the sense that lenders know it at the
moment the entrepreneur apply for a loan while the entrepreneur is not able to
identify ex-ante which β will be applied to his asset. He only knows its distribution
function.
Notice that, the assumption that one unit of asset worth β for the lender imply
that two or more entrepreneurs with the same value of asset A may be diﬀerently
evaluated by the lenders. We interpret the diﬀerence between the value of an asset
posted as collateral and the evaluation of the lender, as the lender’s cost of liquidat-
ing an asset in the event of default.
The functioning of the market is the following:
Stage 0 : Lenders simultaneously oﬀer credit contracts. Entrepreneurs decide
whether to apply or not for credit.
Stage 1 : Lenders and entrepreneurs meet in the credit market. Lenders decide
whether to reject or approve each loan application they receive.
Stage 2 : Financed entrepreneurs, if any, privately choose eﬀort.
Stage 3 : Payoﬀ are realized
2.4 Credit Market Analysis
2.4.1 Supply side
The ﬁnancing contract proposed by the lender to the entrepreneur, if any, is com-
posed by two elements: the cost of credit RL and the amount of guarantees G to
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secure the loan. According to the above assumption the contract is a pair of ele-
ments that depend on β, that is C(β)≡{RL,β, Gβ}.
The expected payoﬀ of a lender that ﬁnances an entrepreneur is:
pHRL,β + (1− pH)βGβ (2.1)
The lender is willing to ﬁnance an entrepreneur if and only if the following
conditions are satisﬁed:
i. Lender’s participation constraint: his expected payoﬀ is greater or equal to
the cost of investing I unit of capital at the opportunity cost of capital r
ii. Borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint: borrower’s expected return
exerting high eﬀort is greater or equal to the expected return he will get ex-
erting low eﬀort plus the private beneﬁt.
From the above conditions it follows:
Lemma 1 (Minimum Guarantees). The minimum amount of guarantees necessary
for a lender to ﬁnance an entrepreneur is:
Gmin(β) = max(
I(1 + r)− pH(R− BΔp)
pH + (1− pH)β , 0) (2.2)
Proof. See appendix.
2.4.2 Demand side
According to the loan contract scheme the expected payoﬀ of a ﬁnanced entrepreneur
is:
pH(R−RL,β)− (1− pH)Gβ + A (2.3)
Given positive cost of application and uncertainty on evaluation of his asset, the




π(β)I{A>Gβ}{pH(R−RL,β)− (1− pH)Gβ}}+ A− c (2.4)
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where π(β) is the cumulative mass function of β.
From above the following emerges:
Lemma 2 (Maximum Guarantees). The maximum amount of asset that an en-






Lemma 3 (Application Decision). En entrepreneur is willing to apply for a loan if




π(β)I{A>Gβ}{pH(R−RL,β)− (1− pH)Gβ} (2.6)
Proof. See appendix
2.5 Equilibrium analysis
The peculiarity of this environment is not only that there exist a moral hazard
problem but also that there exist uncertainty on how the lender evaluate the en-
trepreneur’s asset. In such situation where lenders apply diﬀerent discount factor
depending on the type of asset posted to guarantee the loan, lenders’ loan contracts
portfolio contains as many contract as the number of βs. In this simple framework
where β takes only two values, we will have two diﬀerent contract. However it is
important to highlight that despite there are many contracts, the entrepreneur has
no chance to choose among them. It is the lender that decides to assign a speciﬁc
contract to any entrepreneur based on the asset oﬀered as collateral.
In any equilibrium lenders will be oﬀering contracts such that entrepreneurs have
the right incentive to exert high eﬀort.
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium Contract). Any equilibrium contract C(β) is deﬁned as
a pair of elements RL,β and Gβ, which solve the following problem:
max
RL,β ,Gβ
: pH(R−RL,β)− (1− pH)Gβ + A (2.7)
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1. Lender’s participation constraint (LPC):
pHRL,β + (1− pH)βGβ ≥ I(1 + r) (2.8)
2. Borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint (BICC):
ICC(β) : pH(R−RL,β)−(1−pH)Gβ ≥ pL(R−RL,β)− (1− pL)Gβ +B (2.9)
The following result holds:










with β = {β, β}
Proof. See appendix
2.5.1 Properties of the equilibrium outcome
The interesting cases are the contracts with positive value of guarantees, which imply
that en entrepreneur in order to be ﬁnanced must have suﬃcient wealth to post as
collateral. Such contracts, and so the necessary value of guarantees, are function
of β. In this speciﬁc case where β takes only two values there are two diﬀerent
equilibrium contracts, C(β) and C(β), where G∗
β
< G∗β. Under the assumption that
entrepreneurs are heterogeneous both on wealth and on the liquidation value of the
asset, both equilibrium contracts may coexist in the market. Moreover, conditional
on wealth, some entrepreneurs can aﬀord only one of the contracts.




, that is the equilibrium contracts with positive value of guarantees. According
to the model the properties of the equilibrium outcome concern:
a. the clustering of the entrepreneurs according to their wealth;
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b. the supply of credit;
c. the demand of credit;
a. Clustering of the entrepreneurs according to their wealth. The presence of
two equilibrium contracts each requiring a diﬀerent value of asset to fulﬁll the level
of guarantees required in each contract, imply that the ﬁnancing possibility depends
on the entrepreneur’s wealth. The value of guarantees in the equilibrium contracts
determines three diﬀerent areas where entrepreneurs are clustered according to their
wealth:
i. Poor entrepreneurs with asset A < G∗
β
ii. Rich entrepreneurs with asset A ∈ [G∗
β
, G∗β)
iii. Super rich entrepreneur with asset A ≥ G∗β
b. Supply of credit. For each group of entrepreneur as identiﬁed above, we can
identify which entrepreneurs a bank is willing to ﬁnance.
i. Poor entrepreneurs will never be ﬁnanced. These entrepreneurs are so poor
that their wealth does not reach even the minimum guarantees requirement
necessary to aﬀord at least one of the contracts.
ii. Rich entrepreneurs, which have an intermediate value of asset, would be ﬁnanced
only if the bank’s asset evaluation is high, which corresponds to the contract
with β = β. These entrepreneurs have suﬃcient wealth to aﬀord only the
contract with the lower level of guarantees. In fact, for a certain asset A, if for
the bank its liquidation value is the lowest, then the entrepreneur is not able
to fulﬁll the required level of guarantees given that A < G∗β.
iii. Super rich entrepreneur would be always ﬁnanced regardless the β. These
entrepreneurs have enough wealth to aﬀord the contract with the highest level
of guarantees.
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c. Demand of credit. From Lemma 3 we know that an entrepreneur decides
whether to apply or not for a loan conditional on his application cost. An en-
trepreneur will apply if such cost does not exceed the threshold value indicated in
equation (2.6).
i. Poor entrepreneurs will never apply for a loan regardless their application cost.
ii. Rich and super rich entrepreneurs are not willing to apply for a loan for any
application cost c > c(β,A).
Notice that the threshold value c(β,A) is not the same for rich and super rich
entrepreneurs. As explained above, the entrepreneurs know that their ﬁnancing
possibility depends on the wealth they have. This involves a diﬀerent expected
payoﬀ between rich and super rich entrepreneurs, and thus a diﬀerent threshold
value of the application cost.
In particular rich entrepreneurs calculate their expected payoﬀ taking into account
that they will be ﬁnanced only in the case of high bank evaluation of the asset. It
is immediate to see that their threshold value is:
c(β,A|A ∈ [G∗
β
, G∗β)) ≡ π(β)I{A>G∗
β
}{pH(R−R∗L,β)− (1− pH)G∗β} (2.11)
On the other hand, super rich entrepreneurs, knowing that they can obtain credit
under both contracts, calculate their expected payoﬀ considering both contracts. In
this case the threshold value of the application cost is:
c(β,A|A > G∗β) ≡
β∑
β=β
π(β)I{A>G∗β}{pH(R−R∗L,β)− (1− pH)G∗β} (2.12)
2.5.2 Market outcomes and implications
Given the clustering of entrepreneurs’ according to their wealth, the combination of
lenders and borrowers best reply gives the following six market outcomes:
i. Self-rationed entrepreneurs: composed by all the poor entrepreneurs.
ii. Rationed entrepreneurs: composed by the rich entrepreneurs that apply
for a loan but that are not ﬁnanced because they cannot aﬀord the contract
oﬀered.
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iii. Rich-discouraged entrepreneurs: composed by the rich entrepreneurs that
do not apply for a loan.
iv. Rich-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs: composed by the entrepreneurs that apply
for a loan and are ﬁnanced with the contract C(β).
v. Super rich-discouraged entrepreneurs: composed by the super rich en-
trepreneurs that don not apply for a loan.
vi. Super rich-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs: composed by all the super rich en-
trepreneur that apply for a loan, which are all ﬁnanced.
Notice that the equilibrium outcome imply a probability to be ﬁnanced which





Speciﬁcally, the probability to be ﬁnanced is zero for poor entrepreneurs, less
than one for rich entrepreneurs and one for super-rich entrepreneurs. Hence, it
emerges that some discouraged borrowers would have received credit if they had
apply. We refers to: rich-discouraged entrepreneurs that would have received a high
asset evaluation by the lender and super rich-discouraged entrepreneurs. However
there is a diﬀerence between these two type of borrowers. For super rich-discouraged
borrowers ex-ante and ex-post probability to be ﬁnanced is the same and it is equal
to one. Rich-discouraged borrowers have an ex-ante probability to be ﬁnanced less
than one, while ex-post some would have zero probability to be ﬁnanced and all the
others a probability to be ﬁnanced equal to one.
2.6 Empirical implications
For wealth greater than G∗β all ﬁrms will be ﬁnanced with ex-ante probability of 1.
Given positive application cost c we may have:
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i. ﬁnanced ﬁrms with c ≤ c(β,A|A > G∗β)
ii. discouraged ﬁrms with c > c(β,A|A > G∗β)
For wealth between G∗
β
and G∗β ﬁrm will be ﬁnanced with ex-ante probability less
than 1. Given positive cost of application we may have:
i. applicants ﬁrm with c ≤ c(β,A|A ∈ [G∗
β
, G∗β))
ii. discouraged ﬁrms with c > c(β,A|A ∈ [G∗
β
, G∗β))
iii. some applicant ﬁrms are denied
For wealth less than G∗
β
all ﬁrm will be credit denied. We may have that all the
ﬁrms are non applicant regardless the cost of application.
The threshold value of the application cost for entrepreneur with intermediate value
of wealth is lower than the threshold value for the rich entrepreneur.
2.7 Empirical analysis
2.7.1 The ﬁnancing process
The main focus of this empirical analysis is to evaluate if non-applicant ﬁrms could
be ﬁnanced in case they applied for a loan. This counterfactual is not observable
and can be estimated under some assumptions that will be explained in this section.
Preliminary, it is crucial to describe how the ﬁnancing process works in the data.
Using survey data from 2003 US NSSBF we have designed the loan-granting process
as a set of sequential decision steps similarly to the multistage model of loan of
Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2009). Starting from the initial sample of the ﬁrms we
may assume that in each stage there is a decision that implies a selection. The
process is decomposed as follows:
1. The need of credit of ﬁrms: ﬁrms declare whether they need credit or not.
2. The application decision: ﬁrms decide whether to apply for a bank loan or not.
3. The ﬁnancing decision: the bank decides whether to grant the loan or not for
those ﬁrms that applied (approval model).
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Figure 2.1: The Financing process
As illustrated in ﬁgure 1 in the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing process discouragement appears
to be more relevant than credit denial. We see that among the ﬁrms that needed
credit, 14% of them were discouraged to apply for a loan because they feel they will
be rejected. The denied ﬁrms account only for the 6% of the sample.
The counterfactual for the probability of being ﬁnanced for discouraged ﬁrms is
estimated using the predicted probability obtained from the approval model. The
use of predicted probability could be questioned considering that the group of non
applicants are not considered in the model of approval and so this latter would be
diﬀerent in case all these ﬁrms applied. We show that this argument is not relevant
in this case.
The model shows that the ﬁnal outcome that we observe in the loan market repre-
sents an equilibrium in which all the participants, i.e. non applicants ﬁrms, denied
ﬁrms ﬁnanced ﬁrms and the bank, do not ﬁnd proﬁtable to deviate given the best
response of the other participants.
In the model we also assume that the approval model of the bank is common knowl-
edge among all the categories of the ﬁrms: ﬁnanced, denied and discouraged.
The approval model used by the bank is based on the pool of applicants and it rep-
resents its best response. This means that the policy of the bank does not change
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even in the case a non applicant decides to apply for a loan.
Starting from this assumption we want to test what would be the estimated proba-
bility for a given non applicant in the hypothetical case she apply.
In other words, we want to test if there is or not a proﬁtable deviation for discour-
aged ﬁrm, i.e. if they would be ﬁnanced had they applied. Predicted probabilities
represent exactly what is the probability of ﬁnancing in case a single ﬁrm is subject
to the approval model of the bank. The reasonable hypothesis is that the behavior
of just one ﬁrm does not aﬀect the approval model used by the bank. The usual
concern that the model of ﬁnancing would be diﬀerent in case non applicants would
have applied does not apply in this case.
2.7.2 Empirical methodology
Starting from the estimation of the approval model used by the bank to decide wether
to ﬁnance or not a ﬁrm, we use the predicted values to estimate the probability
of being ﬁnanced for discouraged and denied ﬁrms. The dependent variable is a
dichotomous variable that take value of 1 if the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced and 0 otherwise.
We can observe it only if the ﬁrm decided to apply for a loan. Thus, estimating
the probability of being ﬁnanced, according to the approval model of the bank, the
sample selection is accounted as follows:
Ai = 1[ZA,iαA + uA,i > 0] (2.14)
Fi = 1[ZF,iαF + uF,i > 0] (2.15)
where Ai > 0 if a potential borrower decides to apply for a loan (Ai ≤ 0 oth-
erwise) and Fi > 0 if the bank decides to ﬁnance the ﬁrm (Fi ≤ 0 otherwise) and
is observed only if Ai = 1[α
′
AZA,i + uA,i > 0] holds; ZA,i and ZF,i are vectors of
covariates aﬀecting the application decision and the ﬁnancing decision. uA,i and uF,i
are the correlated error terms.
Equation 2.12 is the selection equation, while equation 2.13 is the outcome equa-
tion.
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In the sample ﬁrms fall into one of three categories: 1) they apply for credit
and their application is accepted; 2) they apply for credit and their application is
rejected; 3) they don’t apply for credit.
The probabilities associated with the three types of observations are1:
A = 0 Pr(A = 0) = ΦA(−ZA,iαA)
A = 1, F = 0 Pr(A = 1, F = 0) = ΦA(ZA,iαA)− ΦF (ZA,iαA, ZF,iαF ; ρ)
A = 1, F = 1 Pr(A = 1, F = 1) = ΦF (ZA,iαA, ZF,iαF ; ρ)




AiFilnΦF (ZA,iαA, αFZF,i; ρ) + Ai(1− Fi)ln[ΦA(ZA,iαA)+
−ΦF (ZA,iαA, ZF,iαF ; ρ)] + (1− Ai)lnΦ(−ZA,iαA) (2.16)
We estimate the ML employing the ”heckprob” command of STATA.
As in the Heckman’s two steps selection model (Heckman, 1979) in order to
correctly identify the model we need an exclusion restriction, i.e at least one variable
that is correlated with the decision to apply but that does not aﬀect the ﬁnancing
decision of the bank is needed.
2.7.3 Data and descriptive statistics
The data in this paper have been obtained from the National Survey of Small Busi-
ness Finances (SSBF), which has been conducted in 2004-2005 for the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The public data set provides informa-
tions for a sample of 4240 ﬁrms, selected from the target population of all for-proﬁt,
non-ﬁnancial, non-farm, non-subsidiary business enterprises that had fewer than 500
employees and were in operation as of year-end 2003 and on the date of the inter-
view. The Survey collected informations on the availability and use of credit and
other ﬁnancial services along with informations on ﬁrm demographic characteristics
1See Greene, 2003
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for up to three individual owners, and other informations on the number of workers,
organizational form, location, credit history, income statement and balance sheet
data. The survey asks the respondents to provide informations whether the ﬁrm
applied for credit during the last three years (from 2001 to 2003) and, in that case,
whether the most recent application for credit was denied. Moreover, the survey re-
ports information on whether in the same period the ﬁrm, though it needed credit,
did not apply for loans fearing rejection.
The sample of ﬁrms that need credit, that either applied for a loan or not, fearing
rejection, is called potential borrowers and it represents my sample of interest with
2227 observations. The sample of potential borrowers can be split in non applicants
or discouraged ﬁrms and applicants. Among applicants there are ﬁrms that have
been ﬁnanced and ﬁrms that have been denied.
The category of discouraged ﬁrm has been identiﬁed using the following question of
the survey: ”During the past three years, were there times when the ﬁrm needed
credit, but did not apply because it thought the application would be turned down?”
A discouraged ﬁrm is the one who answered ”yes” to the question.
The category of ﬁnanced ﬁrm corresponds to those ﬁrms which their applications
for a loan was always or sometimes approved during the last three years. While
those ﬁrms that applied for a loan and were always denied represent the category of
denied ﬁrms.
Table 1 and 2 present summary statistics of several variables on owner’s character-
istics, ﬁrm’s characteristics and ﬁrm-lender relationships for the diﬀerent categories
of ﬁrms. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for potential borrowers, applicants
and discouraged borrowers. Table 2 reports the same summary statistics for dis-
couraged, denied and ﬁnanced ﬁrms.
From Table 1 we can see that on average applicant ﬁrms and discouraged ﬁrms
are very diﬀerent for most of the characteristics analyzed. In fact, except for
ownposgrad (1st owner has postgraduate degree), hisp (1st owner is hispanic),
owntotpw (owner total personal wealth), capassetontass (capital asset/total asset)
which means-diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, for
all other variables the means-diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
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zero. Comparing owner’s characteristics between applicants ﬁrms and discouraged
ﬁrms, the latters are signiﬁcantly younger, less experienced and less educated. They
also have worse owner credit quality by all measures: owner bankruptcy, owner
delinquencies, owner judgments. They are also likely to be black, asian and female.
Concerning ﬁrm characteristics and balance sheet indicators discouraged ﬁrms are
smaller, younger, more likely to be owned by a family, more highly levered, have
more cash and less net proﬁt than applicant ﬁrms. Discouraged ﬁrms are also worse
in terms of ﬁrm credit quality and they are also more likely to be managed by the
ﬁrst owner of the ﬁrm. In terms of ﬁrm-lender relationships characteristics discour-
aged ﬁrms deal with a fewer number of ﬁnancial institutions and have signiﬁcantly
shorter relationships (measured in years) with their primary source of ﬁnancial ser-
vices. Discouraged ﬁrms have also shorter relationships with all their sources of
ﬁnancial services if we control for the average length of relationships of all these
institutions.
In Table 2 the comparison is between discouraged, denied and ﬁnanced ﬁrms. We
also run t-test for testing diﬀerences in means between discouraged and denied ﬁrms
and between denied and ﬁnanced ﬁrms. Comparing discouraged ﬁrms with denied
ﬁrms we ﬁnd that the two categories are very similar in most of the owner and ﬁrm
characteristics, in particular for those concerning credit quality. The same similarity
is signiﬁcant when we control credit risk through balance sheet indicators. Moreover
discouraged and denied ﬁrms are similar for the length of the relationships in years
with their primary sources of ﬁnancial services and also for the average length of
relationships with all their sources of ﬁnancial services. However discouraged ﬁrms
are owned by person less experienced, higher educated, less likely to be black and
with an higher percentage of past bankruptcies than denied ﬁrms.
From the comparison between denied and ﬁnanced ﬁrms it is immediate to see that
the two groups are diﬀerent for almost all the owner and ﬁrm characteristics. Denied
ﬁrms are younger, smaller, less experienced, less educated and riskier than ﬁnanced
ﬁrms. Denied ﬁrms have also shorter relationships with their primary ﬁnancial in-
stitution than ﬁnanced.
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2.8.1 Bivariate probit with selection: the approval model and the deci-
sion to apply
The equations that I estimate with a bivariate probit with selection are the follow-
ings:
applyi = owntotpwiβ11 + firmbkruptiβ12 + delinqobliβ13+
+creditScoreiβ14 + debtonassiβ15 + debtOnEqiβ16+
+profit netiβ17 + familyiβ18 + distfirstiβ19 (2.17)
credworthi = owntotpwiβ21 + firmbkruptiβ22 + deliqobbliβ23+
+creditScoreiβ24 + debtonassiβ25 + debtOnEqiβ26+
+profit netiβ27 + familyiβ28 (2.18)
The ﬁrst equation is the selection equation where the dependent variable APPLY
is 1 for the ﬁrms that apply for a loan and 0 otherwise; the second equation is the
outcome equation where the dependent variable CREDWORTH is equal to 1 if the
ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by the bank and 0 otherwise. We include the same explanatory
variables in both equations because, based on the approval model of the bank, we
want to see whether the same variable aﬀect diﬀerently the decision of the ﬁrms to
apply and that of the bank to ﬁnance. In order to identify the model we include
one more variable in the selection equation that works as exclusion restrictions.
We built the approval model of the bank following the existing literature on the
availability of credit according to which a lender is willing to grant a loan to a ﬁrm
when that ﬁrm shares characteristics of other ﬁrms that historically have repaid
their credits (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo 1998; Cole 1998; Cavalluzzo and Wolken
2005; Chakravarty and Yilmazer 2009). We have included a list of variables that
control for ﬁrm quality, ﬁrm creditworthiness and its risk of credit. OWNTOTPW
is the total personal wealth of the ﬁrm owner out of her business; we expect owner
personal wealth aﬀects positively the probability of being ﬁnanced because it can
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be considered as a source of collateral for the bank. Conversely, the wealth of the
owner should be negatively correlated with the decision of the ﬁrm to apply. FIRM-
BKRUPT is a dummy variable with value of 1 if the ﬁrm has declared bankruptcy
within the past seven years; DELINQOBL is a discrete variable that takes value
from 1 to 4 and indicates the number of obligations on which the ﬁrm has been 60
or more days delinquent during the previous three years; we expect those two vari-
ables, that are proxies of the ﬁrm credit risk, to aﬀect negatively both equations. In
fact, in presence of previous bankrupts and of delinquent obligations the probability
of being ﬁnanced will decrease as well as the decision of the ﬁrm to apply, because it
knows that it will be denied with higher probability. CREDITSCORE is the D&B
credit score that takes discrete values from 1 to 6. Higher value of the variable
corresponds to high credit quality. This further measure of credit quality for the
bank should aﬀect positively both the decision of the bank to ﬁnance the ﬁrm and
the decision of the ﬁrm to apply. To control for credit risk we also include some
ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables derived from the ﬁrm balance sheet. DEBTONASS is the
ratio of debt on total asset; DEBTONEQ is the ratio of debt on equity. We expect
to ﬁnd that the decision to apply and the credit availability decrease as those ratios
increase. PROFIT NET is the ﬁrm’s income after all expenses and taxes have been
deducted and is a proxy of creditworthiness of the ﬁrm. We expect to ﬁnd that it
aﬀects positively the decision to apply and the ﬁnancing decision of the bank. FAM-
ILY is a dummy variable with 1 if the ﬁrm is owned by a family. DISTFIRST is the
exclusion restriction and it measures the distance in miles between the ﬁrm and its
primary ﬁnancial institution. We use it as a proxy of the ﬁrm costs of application.
One might disagree with the use of this variable as exclusion restriction because the
distance between the ﬁrm and its ﬁnancial institution could also aﬀect the decision
of the bank. Indeed one can use the distance as a proxy of the monitoring cost for
the bank. However, using the ”1993 NSSBF”, Petersen and Rajan (2002) observe an
increasing distance between the ﬁrm and their lenders. They argue that ”increasing
capital intensity of lending due to the greater usage of tools such as computers and
communication equipment has altered the way loans are made, which, in turn, could
account for the growing distance. Their ﬁndings suggest that technological change
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has eased the ability to lend at a distance and reduced the need for the decisions to
be made where the information is collected.” Those ﬁndings are enough to justify
my hypothesis of the use of the the distance only as a proxy for the application cost
of a ﬁrm and so as exclusion restriction.
In Table 3 are reported the results of the bivariate probit with selection. The
estimated correlation coeﬃcient between the error terms in the two equations is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 5% level. This conﬁrms the hypothesis of sample
selection and also the presence of private information in the decision of the ﬁrm to
apply. The sign of the estimated coeﬃcients in the two equations are as expected
and all the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant either at 1% or 5% level.
2.8.2 Predicted probabilities
At this point of the analysis we are able to build the counterfactual: using the results
of the outcome equation in model (2.15)-(2.16) I compute the conditional predicted
probabilities of being ﬁnanced for all potential borrowers: discouraged, denied and
ﬁnanced ﬁrms.
In Table 4 is reported the average probability of being ﬁnanced for each category
of ﬁrms. As expected, the predicted probabilities conﬁrm what we have seen in
the summary statistics. Discouraged show an average probability of being ﬁnanced
around 85%, while applicants reach 93% and the ﬁnanced ﬁrms have 94% prob-
ability to be ﬁnanced on average. Interestingly, discouraged ﬁrms have the same
average probability of being ﬁnanced of the ﬁrms that apply and are denied. These
preliminary results suggest a similarity between the group of discouraged and of
denied ﬁrms. Another check on the validity of the hypothesis of similarity between
those two groups is made by plotting the pdf and the cdf of the probability of being
ﬁnanced for the three groups of interest: discouraged, denied and ﬁnanced. From
graph 2 it can be seen that the probability density function for the discouraged
is very similar to the one of the denied; while the pdf of the probability of being
ﬁnanced for the ﬁnanced is diﬀerent compared to the other two groups. In graph 3
there is the plot of the cdfs. From this graph we see that the probability of being
ﬁnanced of ﬁnanced ﬁrms ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate the probability of being
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ﬁnanced of the other two groups. While is not clear which order of dominance there
is between discouraged and denied distribution functions; but this last issue is not
a relevant aspect. A Kolmogrov-Smirnov test of equal distributions conﬁrms that
the pdfs of the probability of being ﬁnanced for the denied and the discouraged are
not statistically diﬀerent, while the hypothesis of equal distributions between denied
and ﬁnanced is rejected at 1% level.
2.8.3 Probability of being ﬁnanced and distance
So far we have seen that discouraged ﬁrms and denied ﬁrms share the same owner
and ﬁrm characteristics. We also know that they have the same average probabil-
ity of being ﬁnanced and that the distribution of this probability between the two
groups is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. However, despite discouraged and
denied would have the same probability of being ﬁnanced some apply for a loan and
the other do not because they feel to be rejected. How we can explain this diﬀerence
among ﬁrms behavior that appear to be equal in most of their characteristics? It
could be that the decision whether to apply or not is driven by some unobservable
characteristics that the researcher is not able to identify. Another explanation is
that discouraged ﬁrms do not apply for a loan because of higher cost of application
with respect to denied ﬁrms. This explanation is coherent with the initial hypothesis
that what we observe in the credit market is an equilibrium outcome. Speciﬁcally,
for discouraged ﬁrms is not proﬁtable to apply for a loan once they predict their
probability of being ﬁnanced. A proxy of the application cost that I use in the esti-
mation is the distance between the ﬁrm and its primary source of ﬁnancial services.
Based on this hypothesis we control the average distance between ﬁrms and their
primary ﬁnancial institution for high and low probability of being ﬁnanced of the
ﬁnanced. We compute the median (95.6%) and the mean (93.6%) of the probability
of being ﬁnanced of the ﬁnanced and we use them as thresholds to discriminate
between ﬁrms with high and low probability of ﬁnancing. In Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 the
results are shown. Discouraged ﬁrms that have a probability to be ﬁnanced above
the median value, show an average distance which is 37% higher than applicants
(Tab. 5). Considering the mean as threshold value, the distance for the discour-
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aged is more than three times higher than applicants, and this diﬀerence in means
is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level (Tab. 7). If the distance is a proxy of the
application cost, discouragement can be explained by diﬀerences in the application
costs.
Comparing discouraged and denied ﬁrms we may observe that diﬀerences in the
average distance from the bank are smaller. Although this diﬀerences in means are
not statistically signiﬁcant, discouraged ﬁrms have an average distance which is 29%
above that of denied, considering the median of the probability as threshold value,
and 31% considering the mean as a threshold value (see Tab. 6 and 8).
2.9 Conclusions
Discouragement is a phenomenon that appears to be rather important in small ﬁrms
access to credit. Data used in this paper show that 14% of the small business are
discouraged in the US, versus a 6% of denied. Under the economic perspective it is
important to assess whether or not discouragement can be assimilated to rationing.
In this paper we consider this issue in a model with moral hazard in which ﬁrms diﬀer
by their wealth, the liquidation value of assets they can post as collateral and the
cost of application. The combination of these elements gives the following results:
all poor entrepreneurs are self-rationed; rich and super rich entrepreneurs can be
discouraged depending on the level of application cost; some rich entrepreneurs that
apply may be rationed. Moreover, the model predicts a probability to be ﬁnanced
which is zero for poor entrepreneurs, less than one for rich entrepreneurs and one for
super-rich entrepreneurs. Hence, it emerges that some discouraged borrowers would
have received credit if they had apply.
Empirically we test the prediction of the model in two steps:
1) through an univariate analysis we check if discouraged ﬁrms diﬀer substantially
from rationed ﬁrms;
2) we compare discouraged and denied ﬁrms trough their estimated probability of
being ﬁnanced.
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The probability of being ﬁnanced for all the categories of ﬁrms, is obtained modeling
the process of ﬁrm access to credit as a sequence of decisions, which involves self
selection. This probability is used as counterfactual for discouraged, i.e. to calculate
the likelihood of ﬁnancing if they had applied. The use of predicted probabilities
as counterfactual is justiﬁed by the model where we assumed that all three groups
of ﬁrms (discouraged, denied and ﬁnanced) know the approval model of the bank
and decide whether to apply or not, predicting their probability of being ﬁnanced.
On the other hand we assume that the ﬁnancing decision rule of the bank does not
change if one discouraged ﬁrm would deviate, and each agent is playing his best
response.
We ﬁnd that denied and discouraged ﬁrms are similar in most of the owner and
ﬁrm characteristics. We control for the probability to be ﬁnanced and the cost of
application. We ﬁnd that discouraged ﬁrms have the same average probability of
being ﬁnanced of the ﬁrms that apply and are denied. Moreover, as predicted by
the model, empirical results show that discouraged ﬁrms with high probability to be
ﬁnanced may have given up the application because of higher costs of application.
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2.10.1 Proof of lemma 1
The lender participation constraint is:
pHRL,β + (1− pH)βGβ ≥ I(1 + r) (2.10.1)
The borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint is:
pH(R−RL,β)− (1− pH)Gβ ≥ pL(R−RL,β)− (1− pL)Gβ +B (2.10.2)




If we impose lender’s participation constraint binding (lenders are making zero
proﬁt), the lender is taking the minimum reward necessary to be able to ﬁnance
en entrepreneurs. From eq. (2.10.1) with equality we can write RL,β as function of
G:
RL,β =
I(1 + r)− (1− pH)βGβ
pH
(2.10.4)
It is easy to see that the gross interest rate is a decreasing function of Gβ. As Gβ
increase the LHS of eq. (??), which corresponds to the borrower’s remuneration,
increases while the RHS of the same equation decreases and the BICC becomes
slack. As Gβ decrease: RL,β increase, the LHS of eq. (??) decrease and the RHS
increase. Thus Gβ can decrease up to BICC binding. It follows that the minimum
amount of guarantees a lender requires in order to ﬁnance an entrepreneur, which
we call Gmin(β) can be found with BICC and LPC binding. It follows that:
Gmin(β) = max(
I(1 + r)− pH(R− BΔp)
pH + (1− pH)β , 0) (2.10.5)




0 if pHR− I(1 + r) ≥ pH BΔp
I(1+r)−pH(R− BΔp )
pH+(1−pH)β if pHR− I(1 + r) < pH BΔp
(2.10.6)
60 Pasqualina Arca, Access to credit for SMEs: theories and evidence
Tesi di Dottorato in Diritto ed economia dei sistemi produttivi
Universita` di Sassari
2.10.2 Proof of lemma 2
From the participation constraint of the borrower which is pH(R − RL,β) − (1 −
pH)Gβ+A ≥ A we can see that as the value of Gβ increases, the expected payoﬀ of a
ﬁnanced entrepreneur decreases. In order for the borrower’s participation constraint
holding Gβ can increase up to the point the above constraint binds. This point
corresponds to Gmax(β).
2.10.3 Proof of lemma 3
An entrepreneur will apply for a loan if and only if his expected payoﬀ is greater or




π(β)I{A>Gβ}{pH(R−RL,β)− (1− pH)Gβ}}+ A− c) ≥ A (2.10.7)
It is easy to see that the above inequality is satisﬁed for:
c ≤ {∑ββ=β π(β)I{A>Gβ}{pH(R−RL,β)− (1− pH)Gβ}}.
Thus equation (2.6) represents the maximum cost an entrepreneur is willing to incur
during the application process.
2.10.4 Proof of proposition 1
The equilibrium contract is found with both LPC and BICC binding. First of all we
prove that BICC is binding assuming that LPC also binds. Second we prove that
in equilibrium LPC must be binding.
Suppose that the LPC binds. Then we can substitute equation (??) into both the
objective function and the BICC so that the maximization problem reduce to:
max
Gβ
: pHR− I(1 + r)− (1− pH)(1− β)Gβ + A
s.t. :




− pH + (1− pH)β
pH
Gβ
The objective function is decreasing in Gβ. Thus the utility of a borrower that
apply for a loan is maximized with the lowest value of guarantees compatible with
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the BICC. It is easy to see that the maximum is attained with BICC binding, which
corresponds to the value of Gmin(β) as derived in proof of Lemma 1.
Now we prove that in equilibrium the LPC is binding. Suppose not. Then
the candidate equilibrium contract is a contract where each lender that ﬁnance
an entrepreneur makes positive proﬁt. Considering that the number of lender is
greater than the number of entrepreneur, there exist at least one lender who are
not ﬁnancing any entrepreneur. This lender is making zero proﬁt. Thus, he will be
better oﬀ undercutting the competitors by oﬀering a contract that will be strictly
preferred by the entrepreneur. Such contract will give him positive proﬁt, which
destroys the previous candidate equilibrium. Only under the contract that gives
zero proﬁt to lender there is any possibility to undercut the competitor.
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Table 2.3: Bivariate probit with selection
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Outcome: probability to be ﬁnanced
Owner total personal wealth 0.00019∗∗∗ (0.00005)
Firm bankruptcy -0.92867∗∗∗ (0.14538)
Firm delinquencies -0.11668∗∗∗ (0.01679)
Debt on total asset -0.01719∗∗∗ (0.00308)
Proﬁt after taxes (th $) 0.00017∗∗∗ (0.0004)
Debts on equity -0.00314∗∗ (0.00125)
D&B credit score 0.21683∗∗∗ (0.01414)
Firm family owned -0.36618∗∗∗ (0.11222)
Intercept 0.64264∗∗∗ (0.13060)
Selection: ﬁrms that apply
Owner total personal wealth -0.000001∗∗∗ (0.000001)
Firm bankruptcy -0.58388∗∗∗ (0.12112)
Firm delinquencies -0.10935∗∗∗ (0.01337)
Debt on total asset -0.00555∗∗∗ (0.00192)
Proﬁt after taxes (th $) 0.00024∗∗∗ (0.00002)
Debts on equity -0.00064∗∗ (0.00031)
D&B credit score 0.16939∗∗∗ (0.01134)
Firm family owned -0.65371∗∗∗ (0.05062)
Distance from 1st institution -0.00021∗∗ (0.00010)
Intercept 1.20594∗∗∗ (0.07157)
rho 0.74244∗∗ (0.26385)
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 2.4: Summary statistics of predicted probabilities
Pr(apply) Pr(ﬁnanced=1—apply=1)
Obs Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Firms that apply 1872 0.87 0.10 0.03 1.00 0.93 0.08 0.07 1.00
Financed ﬁrms 1742 0.88 0.10 0.03 1.00 0.94 0.07 0.40 1.00
Discouraged ﬁrms 304 0.79 0.12 0.01 0.97 0.85 0.12 0.00 1.00
Denied ﬁrms 130 0.80 0.12 0.31 0.97 0.85 0.13 0.07 1.00
Table 2.5: Average distance for high and low probability of being ﬁnanced with respect
to the median
Categories of ﬁrms All sample <95.6% ≥ 95.6%
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Discouraged 319 34.94 286 33.86 33 44.30
Applicants 1985 26.55 990 20.83 905 32.82
Diﬀerence 13.03 11.49
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 2.6: Average distance for high and low probability of being ﬁnanced with respect
to the median
Categories of ﬁrms All sample <95.6% ≥ 95.6%
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Discouraged 319 34.94 286 33.86 33 44.30
Denied 1985 26.55 118 32.27 18 34.44
Diﬀerence 1.59 9.86
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 2.7: Average distance for high and low probability of being ﬁnanced with respect
to the mean
Categories of ﬁrms All sample <93.6% ≥ 93.6%
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Discouraged 319 34.94 256 18.50 63 101.76
Applicants 1985 26.55 733 17.78 1162 32.08
Diﬀerence 0.71 69.68 ∗∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 2.8: Average distance for high and low probability of being ﬁnanced with respect
to the mean
Categories of ﬁrms All sample <93.6% ≥ 93.6%
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Discouraged 319 34.94 256 18.50 63 101.76
Denied 136 32.56 99 15.68 37 77.73
Diﬀerence 2.82 24.03
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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The signaling role of trade credit
on loan contract: an endogenous
switching approach
3.1 Introduction
Trade credit is widely used as source of ﬁnancing and many studies report that it is
the most important source of short-term external ﬁnance. Elliehausen and Wolken
(1993) report that in 1987 trade credit accounted for about 15% of the liabilities
of non-farm non-ﬁnancial businesses in the United States, and for small businesses
this percentage was about 20% of their liabilities. Rajan and Zingales (1995) report
that in 1991 trade credit (estimated using account payables) amounted to 15% of
total assets for a large sample of non-ﬁnancial US ﬁrms. In the sample used by
Aktas et al. (2012), which contains non-ﬁnancial, US, listed ﬁrms between 1992 and
2007, trade credit represents an average of 8.22% of total assets. Mian and Smith
(1992) report that trade credit comprised 26% of the total debts of non ﬁnancial
ﬁrms listed on the NASDAQ at the end of 1992. The importance of trade credit
as a ﬁnancing source also applies outside of the US. In France, for example, trade
credit represents four times the value of short-term ﬁnancing by ﬁnancial institutions
(Kremp, 2006). Marotta (2005) shows that trade credit ﬁnances on average 38.1%
of the input purchases of non-rationed italian ﬁrms and 37.5% of rationed ones.
This large usage of trade credit is surprising if we compare the cost of trade credit
with the other alternative short-term ﬁnancial resources. In fact, Cun˜at (2007)
pointed-out the equivalent one-year interest rate of a ”two part” contract is about
70
44%. The reasons of the relative importance of trade credit have been investigated
by many scholars. The existing literature can be divided in two main ﬁelds: non-
ﬁnancial theories and ﬁnancial theories. The main discussion among the ﬁnancial
theories is whether trade credit is a substitute or complement of bank credit. Along
the same lines as this strand of the literature this paper analyzes the relationship
between trade credit and bank credit. While the majority of past researches focused
on the substitution role of trade credit, only few theoretical and empirical research
have exploited its complementary motif. On the theoretical perspective Biais and
Gollier (1997) argue that trade credit is used to reduce the information asymmetry
between ﬁrms and bank, thus acting as a complementary ﬁnancing resource. With
asymmetric information and without the possibility of ﬁnancing trough trade credit
ﬁrms are not able to receive credit. Therefore trade credit acts as channel for
good ﬁrms to signal their quality to the bank. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) argue
that both complementary and substitution eﬀect are inside the use of trade credit
depending on the ﬁrms’ aggregate debt capacity. Several research attempted to
ﬁnd the empirical evidence of the substitution or complementarity between trade
and bank credit. Most of the research focus on the substitution role while a small
empirical literature have answered the question about its complementarity. Our
purpose is to test the complementarity resulting from the Biais and Gollier (1997)
model. According to their model ﬁrms decide whether to use trade credit or not
depending on the expected outcome in the bank credit market and bank decides
whether to extend credit depending on what they observe in the trade credit market.
In order to carry on the test we need an estimation methodology that accounts for
the simultaneity of the two interdependent decisions. We use a switching regression
approach in which the decision to use trade credit depends also on the anticipated
outcome in the bank credit market. Our contribution to the existing literature on
the complementarity hypothesis is toward the following direction. The paper is
the ﬁrst that test both the assumption and the equilibrium properties of the Biais
and Gollier model, accounting for the endogeneity arising from the simultaneous
decisions of bank and ﬁrms.
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3.2 Theoretical and empirical background
The literature on ﬁnancial theories of trade credit focuses on its relationship with
bank loans in presence of credit market imperfections, which cause ﬁnancial in-
stitutions to ration credit to their customers. According to many empirical studies
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1997; Danielson and Scott, 2004; Demiroglu et al., 2012)
bank credit and trade credit are substitute as there is evidence that ﬁrms demand
and/or receive more trade credit when they ﬁnd diﬃcult to obtaining bank loans.
These these studies are based on the hypothesis that loan availability aﬀects the
demand for trade credit, but clearly it could be also the case that is the amount of
trade credit that inﬂuence the decision of the bank to deny or extend credit.
The studies by Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1997) represent the most comprehensive
analysis on credit availability and trade credit. Their detailed studies analyze both
the demand and the supply of trade credit with the aim to empirically assess the
diﬀerent theories of trade credit without focusing on any particular question. Pe-
tersen and Rajan (1994) assume exogeneity of bank credit as a result of the pecking
order theory according to which given the higher cost of trade credit, this source of
ﬁnancing is used only when bank credit becomes unavailable. For example, trade
credit may be used especially during periods of ﬁnancial distress (Wilner, 2000;
Cun˜at, 2007). However other studies show that trade credit is not necessarily more
expensive than bank credit (Marotta, 2005; Miwa and Ramseyer, 2008), and hence
the assumption of exogeneity of bank credit is questionable.
Danielson and Scott (2004) address this issue. They estimate whether credit avail-
ability aﬀects ﬁrms’ trade credit demand through a simultaneous equation system.
Their results conﬁrm that the relative importance of trade credit among the other
ﬁnancing sources increases when bank loans are not available. Petersen and Rajan
(1997) model trade credit demand as a function of trade credit supply, the ﬁrm’s
total demand for credit, the bank credit availability and the price of bank credit.
They employ a simultaneous equation model ﬁnding a negative relation between
ﬁrm-banking relationship and trade credit demand. They also identify that trade
credit demand and loan denials are positively, albeit not statistically signiﬁcant, cor-
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related. The interpretation of this result is diﬃcult to reconcile with the hypothesis
of substitution between trade credit and bank credit, as it arises when there are
weak ﬁrm-bank relationship, but not when the ﬁrm has been turned down by the
bank. If the strength of bank relationship aﬀects the likelihood of loan approval and
thereby also inversely the trade credit demand, as point out by Danielson and Scott
(2004), there is an underlining collinearity when both banking relationship strength
and loan denial variables are included to explain trade credit. This may explain why
the above results are such contradictory.
These empirical contributions neglect some important issues. First, there is no di-
rect evaluation of the role of information in the substitutability between the two
ﬁnancing resources. In addition, if there is asymmetric information, it could be the
case that the decision of using trade credit conveys some information on the ﬁrm
quality that aﬀects both the bank decision to extend credit and the contractual
terms of the loan. Moreover, in such framework where trade credit is a complement
of bank credit, another source of endogeneity may arise. The decision to use trade
credit may be driven by ﬁrms expectation about loan approval and interest rate
charged.
The theoretical foundation for this argument is provided by Biais and Gollier (1997)
according to which trade credit can alleviate bank credit rationing due to asym-
metric information between banks and ﬁrms. When trade credit can be used and if
seller have suﬃcient expected future cash ﬂow to pledge as collateral, there exist an
equilibrium where sellers extend trade credit to their customers only if they have re-
ceived a good signal, and where the positive information contained in the availability
of trade credit induces the bank to also lend, if it also has received a good signal.
In such situation trade credit plays an important role because it is a credible way
for the seller to convey its private information to the bank. If the seller is willing to
extend trade credit, and thus to bear the default risk of the buyer, it must be that
it has good information about the latter. On observing this, the bank updates pos-
itively its beliefs about the buyer, and therefore agrees to lend. Trade credit enable
the private information of the seller to be used in the lending relationship, and this
additional information can alleviate credit rationing due to adverse selection. On the
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same wake, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) set up a theoretical model which implies
that bank credit and trade credit can be either substitutes or complements. A salient
result of the model is that the availability of trade credit increases the amount that
banks are willing to lend. For a given bank loan, additional trade credit permits the
borrower higher level of diversion as well as investment. Anticipating that available
trade credit boosts investment rather than diversion, banks are willing to increase
their lending. Hence, bank credit and trade credit are complements for ﬁrms whose
aggregate debt capacity constrains investment. By contrast, for ﬁrms with suﬃcient
aggregate debt capacity, trade credit is a substitute for bank credit.
This complementarity hypothesis has been studied empirically only by few papers.
Cook (1997) tests the signaling role of trade credit in a sample of Russian ﬁrms using
a probit model to estimate the probability to obtain bank credit, where trade credit
enters in the estimation as an exogenous variable. In this estimation the direction
of causality runs from trade ﬁnance to bank ﬁnance, but the possibility that the
decision to use trade credit is endogenous is not taken into account. Alphonse et al
(2006) address the endogeneity of trade credit using a simultaneous equation model.
They propose to link the complementarity eﬀect and the substitutability eﬀect to
diﬀerent classes of small businesses. They argue that ﬁrms that beneﬁt from long
term banking relationship have no incentives to use trade credit: for these ﬁrms only
the substitution hypothesis should be relevant. On the contrary, for ﬁrms with poor
banking relationship, also the complementary hypothesis becomes relevant, because
some ﬁrms of good quality use trade credit to signal themselves.
In this paper we test the complementarity between trade credit and bank credit
employing a diﬀerent approach with respect to the previous research. Following the
theoretical result of Biais and Gollier (1997), we try to disentangle the endogeneity
that exists between bank credit availability and trade credit using and endogenous
switching regression model. This approach enable us to:
i. evaluate the role of information in the relation between trade credit credit and
bank credit;
ii. take into account possible treatment eﬀects arising from the use of trade credit.
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3.3 The relationship between trade credit bank credit
Biais and Gollier (1997) argue that trade credit is used to facilitate ﬁrms with
valuable project to obtain ﬁnancing and thus reducing credit rationing. Although
their deﬁnition of credit rationing diﬀers slightly from the original one by Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981), their model still sheds light on the relationship between credit market
breakdown and asymmetric information. In Biais and Gollier (1997) framework
credit rationing occurs if the bank charges an interest rate higher than the cash
ﬂow generated by the investment. At this interest rate good ﬁrms are not willing
to undertake the project even if its NPV is positive. Such situation arises when
asymmetric information does not allow the bank to identify between good and bad
ﬁrms and there is a large fraction of bad ﬁrms, or the signal the bank receives is
quite imprecise. The model implies that asymmetric information between banks
and ﬁrms can be reduced if ﬁrms are able to ﬁnance a fraction of their investment
through trade credit. Despite the fact that trade credit is more costly than bank
credit, it is used to convey the private information held by the sellers to the banks
and thus reducing credit rationing due to adverse selection. Our purpose is to carry
on an empirical test of the ”Biais and Gollier (1997) model”. In the following we
describe some of predictions that we want to test.
1. Decision to use trade credit.
Firms which do not suﬀer from credit rationing do not use trade credit, while
ﬁrms for which asymmetric information generates credit rationing react by
using trade credit.
2. Bank interest rates and delayed payment price.
With asymmetric information, if only bank credit is available the interest rate
charged by the bank is so high that good ﬁrms are not willing to undertake
the project. In such situation delayed payments may be extended by the seller
to the buyer, allowing ﬁrms to ﬁnance part of their investment through trade
credit. This arise when the seller and the bank simultaneously receive a good
signal about the quality of the ﬁrm and thus they both extend trade credit
and bank credit respectively to the ﬁrm. With trade credit, the bank interest
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rate is lower compared to the one without it. At this rate good ﬁrms and bad
ﬁrms with two good signals obtain ﬁnancing.
Denoting PTC the delayed payment price of the seller, rB TC the interest rate
charged by the bank conditioned on observing trade credit is extended, and rP
the pooling interest rate charged by the bank, when bank is the only source of
ﬁnancing, we have the following relationship between prices:
rP > PTC > rB TC (3.3.1)
Notice that without asymmetric information the model implies that the interest
rate charged on a good ﬁrm rB|g is equal to the bank’s cost of funds r, and the
following relationship holds:
rP > PTC > rB TC > rB|g (3.3.2)
3. Amount of trade credit.
There exists an interval for the optimal amount of trade credit, where there
is not collusion between agents. For amount of trade credit below the lower-
bound of such interval, sellers and buyers can collude, while for amounts above
the upper-bound banks and buyers can collude. Thus, outside of this interval
no signaling role of trade credit takes place. Therefore, in order to alleviate
credit rationing not only it is suﬃcient for ﬁrms to signal themselves using
trade credit, but such amount must be high enough but not too large.
4. Probability to obtain ﬁnancing
The model explains that ﬁrms that suﬀer from asymmetric information use
costly trade credit to obtain bank credit which otherwise would not be granted;
moreover it is necessary a certain amount of trade credit in order to be ﬁnanced.
Therefore, there exist an implicit probability to be ﬁnanced which, for a ﬁrm
where asymmetric information is relevant, depends both on the decision to use
trade credit and on the amount of trade credit extended. On the other hand,
when there is not asymmetric information the probability to obtain ﬁnancing is
1 for good ﬁrms and zero for bad ﬁrms. Thus, conditional that a certain amount
of trade credit has been extended, for those ﬁrms the probability to receive bank
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credit is 1 while for ﬁrms that do not use trade credit this probability is less
than 1. The explanation is the following: ﬁrms for which the bank observes
that trade credit is extended always receive bank ﬁnancing; these are all the
ﬁrms able to signal themselves as good, (which include both good ﬁrms and
bad ﬁrms with good signal). On the other hand, ﬁrms for which the bank is
able to recognize their quality do not use trade credit. The probability to be
ﬁnanced for this group is less than one, because it includes both good and bad
ﬁrms.
3.4 Empirical setting
The data we use come from the 2003 NSSBF (National Survey of Small Businesses
Finances) conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Detailed information of this dataset are given in section 2.7.3. In the survey there
is also a section regarding the use of trade credit by ﬁrms. We use this information
together with the information on bank ﬁnancing to study the relationship between
trade credit and bank credit. In particular we use the information whether the ﬁrm
used trade credit or not during the last year and the information whether the ﬁrm
has been ﬁnanced by the bank in the last three years, and if yes, what was the
interest rate charged by the bank. As explained in the previous section we want to
test whether the use of trade credit has an eﬀect on the contractual terms between
bank and ﬁrm and on credit rationing. According to the theoretical model of Biais
and Gollier (1997) our hypothesis is that ﬁrms that use trade credit are those that
suﬀer from relevant information asymmetries and thus they may experience credit
rationing. These ﬁrms might use trade credit in order to access ﬁnancing. On the
other hand, ﬁrms whose characteristics are fully observed do not need to use trade
credit to obtain ﬁnancing. All ﬁrms, regardless of whether they use trade credit
or not, apply for bank ﬁnancing and some of them obtain credit at a given interest
rate. Our empirical analysis aims to test whether there exists a relationship between
the decision to use trade credit, the probability to obtain ﬁnancing and the interest
rate charged by the bank (cost of credit). We argue that the decision on the use
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of trade credit may aﬀect the other results, i.e. the probability to obtain ﬁnancing
and the cost of credit, in a diﬀerent way depending on whether the ﬁrm uses trade
credit or not. At the same time ﬁrms decide whether to use trade credit comparing
their expected outcomes in terms of cost of credit and probability to obtain credit
in the two choices. As already discussed, according to Biais and Gollier (1997), the
decision to use trade credit will be undertaken by ﬁrms in order to signal themselves
as of good quality, to be ﬁnanced at an aﬀordable interest rate. We deﬁne these
ﬁrms as opaque ﬁrms. Indeed, if they do not signal themselves, they will be charged
a higher interest rate and thus they will be rationed. On the other hand, we deﬁne
transparent ﬁrms those that decide to not use trade credit because they are better oﬀ
in terms of expected outcome not choosing it. In the data we observe the interest
rate only for ﬁrms that obtain credit for both trade credit users and non-users.
However, for trade credit users we cannot observe the interest rate they would have
paid in case they had not chosen to use trade credit. Viceversa for ﬁrms that chose
not to use trade credit. Thus, in order to carry on the empirical test of the Biais
and Gollier model we need to construct such counterfactual. This analysis allows us
to test:
1. whether the self-selection decision aﬀects the interest rate;
2. if this decision is a way to drive private information from the more informed
agent (the seller) to the less informed one (the bank).
As we explain in section ?? we use either a switching regression and an endogenous
switching regression model.
3.4.1 Empirical assessment of the Biais and Gollier predictions
In this section we describe how we are going to implement and test the prediction
of section 3.3:
1. Decision to use trade credit
In our empirical test we model this decision as follow. According to the above
deﬁnition, we assume that there are two group of ﬁrms: opaque ﬁrms and
transparent ﬁrms. The decision to use trade credit depends on the group they
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belong. Opaque ﬁrms are more likely to use trade credit than transparent
ﬁrms. Thus, when we observe that a ﬁrm did not use trade credit we consider
it as a ﬁrm which characteristics and creditworthiness are fully observed by
the bank. On the contrary, we consider a ﬁrm that used trade credit as a ﬁrm
whose characteristics and creditworthiness are not fully observed by the bank.
2. Bank interest rate and trade credit price
In our empirical analysis, assuming that good transparent ﬁrms will be ﬁnanced
without using trade credit, we expect to ﬁnd, for these ﬁrms, an interest rate
lower than that payed by ﬁrms that use trade credit. Moreover, we expect
that ﬁrms self-select according to their quality and transparency in one of
the two ”tracks”. In particular we expect a negative correlation between the
interest rate and the decision not to use trade credit, while we expect a positive
correlation between the interest rate and the decision to use trade credit. We
expect that ﬁrms that choose to use trade credit do so because are better oﬀ
in terms of lower interest rate than not using it. In fact, as explained above,
in case they do not use trade credit they will be charged the pooling interest
rate, which is the highest rate in the market. Clearly, we cannot observe the
pooling interest rate on the data because at this rate no exchange takes place,
but with some non very restrictive assumptions we are able to construct this
counterfactual exploiting the features of the switching regression model, as will
be explained in the next section ??.
3. Probability to obtain ﬁnancing
We estimate the probability to be ﬁnanced for the two groups of ﬁrms condi-
tional on having used or not trade credit. We expect that the probability to be
ﬁnanced for ﬁrms that use trade credit is higher than that of the other group.
Moreover we also expect an eﬀect of the self selection on this probability. Pre-
cisely we expect that the use of trade credit increase the probability to be
ﬁnanced, while the fact of not having used trade credit reduce this probability.
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We want to investigate whether trade credit is a complementary source of ﬁnancing
of bank credit. According to the implication of the Biais and Gollier (1997) model
ﬁrms decide whether to use trade credit or not depending on the expected outcome
in the bank credit market. On the other hand, bank decides whether to extend credit
taking into account what they observe in the trade credit market. The estimation
methodology should take into account the interdependence of the two simultaneous
decisions. In order to test whether the decision to use trade credit aﬀects the bank
interest rate we cannot use a direct method, because we do not observe the interest
rate that would have been charged if ﬁrms had chosen not to use trade credit. In
this situation the errors in the trade credit equation and those in the interest rate
equation are correlated. As suggested by Li and Prabhala (2007) this situation is a
problem of self-selection, in which the use of trade credit captures some unobserved
heterogeneity in ﬁrm quality, and hence creditworthiness, bringing to light informa-
tion on creditworthiness privately held by the ﬁrms. Therefore, the self-selection is
not the only reason why it is important to consider the decision on the use of trade
credit. If trade credit conveys information of the supplier of trade credit to the bank
about the quality of the ﬁrm, banks would apply diﬀerent interest rate, depending
on whether they observe selection into trade credit or not.
We model the decision to use trade credit as follow:
TC∗i = Ziγ + vi (3.4.1)
where TC represents the value from using trade credit, Z is a set of trade credit
determinants, γ is a vector of parameters and v is the error term. TC∗ is a latent




1 if Ziγ + vi > 0
0 if Ziγ + vi ≤ 0
(3.4.2)
We model the cost of bank credit (R) separately for the two cases as a function of
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a set of loan rate determinants X:
RTC,i = XiβTC + uTC,i (3.4.3)
RNTC,i = XiβNTC + uNTC,i (3.4.4)
where β are vectors of parameters, and u are the error terms. We observe RTC
when TC = 1, but in this case RNTC is not observed, latent or missing. Similarly,
we observe RNTC when TC = 0, in which case RTC is not observed. We assume
that there is interchangeability across states.
This model consisting of equations 3.4.2-3.4.4 cannot be estimated directly because
the observed interest rate is a conditional outcome and depends on the chosen alter-
natives. The empirical estimation requires a switching regression approach. Because
of the failure to observe RTC when TC = 0 and RNTC when TC = 1 we need to
write the expected loan rates for a ﬁrm using trade credit who self-selects into trade
credit. If u and v are bivariate normal we have:
E(RTC,i|TC = 1) = E(RTC,i|TC∗ > 0)
= E(RTC,i|vi > −Ziγ)
= XiβTC + E(uTC |vi < Ziγ)




where φ is the pdf of the standard normal distribution and Φ is the cumulative
density function. The results follows due to the truncation of the distribution of
RTC from below. Similarly, the expected cost of credit for those not using trade
credit is:
E(RNTC,i|TC = 0) = E(RNTC,i|TC∗ ≤ 0)
= E(RNTC,i|vi ≤ −Ziγ)
= XiβNTC + E(uNTC |vi ≥ Ziγ)
= XiβNTC − σNTC,v φ(Ziγ)
1− Φ(Ziγ)
(3.4.6)
which follows from the truncation of RNTC from above. The functions λTC,i =
φ(Ziγ)
Φ(Ziγ)
and λNTC,i = − φ(Ziγ)1−Φ(Ziγ) are the inverse Mills ratio, and they represent the conditional
expectation of v given the selection into trade credit or not respectively.
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The procedure is to estimate in the ﬁrst stage the following equation:
TCi = Ziγ + vi (3.4.7)
From equation 3.4.5 we obtain the linear predictions, Ziγ̂ which are used to calculate
λTC and λNTC .
Employing this switching model we control for self-selection and obtain consistent
estimates of βTC and βNTC estimating the equations ?? and ?? by OLS. The strength
of this model is that it allows for a clear interpretation of the sign of the inverse
Mills ratio, as it tells us the direction of the selection. In addition we are able to
verify some of the theoretical predictions of the Biais and Gollier (1997) model:
1. the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient associated to the inverse Mills ratio
captures the self-selection eﬀects associated with the choice of using trade
credit;
2. the sign of the coeﬃcient of the inverse Mills ratios identiﬁes the beneﬁt in
terms of cost of credit for those that use trade credit compared to non-users;
3. the variables λTC and λNTC are an estimate of the private information underly-
ing the ﬁrm choice, and the test of the signiﬁcance is a test of whether private
information possessed by the ﬁrm explains ex-post results (cost of bank credit)
(Li and Prabhala, 2007).
If the choice of using trade credit conveys information about the quality of the
ﬁrm, it is likely that the trade credit decision depends on the expected outcomes
in terms of cost of credit. Following this argument we model the decision to use
trade credit assuming that it depends on the expected diﬀerence in the cost of credit
RTC − RNTC . This allows for an identiﬁcation of the treatment eﬀect that trade
credit has on interest rate. Following the procedure developed in Lee (1978) we
include as a determinant of the trade credit decision in equation 3.4.5 the cost of
credit diﬀerence for the two groups:
TCi = Ziγ + δ(RTC,i −RNTC,i)− vi (3.4.8)
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The selection into one of the two groups now depends on both exogenous and out-
come variables. The estimation procedure suggested by Lee (1978) and described
in Maddala (1983) is to substitute equations 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 into equation ??. This
gives the following reduced-form:
TCi = Z
∗
i γ − v∗i (3.4.9)
where the matrix Z∗ includes all the variables that determine the trade credit de-
cision as well as the determinants of the cost of credit. From the estimation of









Then we estimate by OLS the loan rate equations augmented by the inverse Mills
ratio, and we obtain the predicted values for R̂TC,i R̂NTC,i, that we substitute into
equation ??, to get consistent estimates of the parameters γ and δ. The statistical
signiﬁcance of parameter δ captures possible treatment eﬀect associated with the
use of trade credit.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 The switching model
We start estimating the standard switching model in equations ??-3.4.5. The set of
Z variables includes:
i. Liquidity on total asset;
ii. Firm proﬁt (thousands dollars);
iii. dummy =1 if sales increased in the last three years;
iv. Firm age (years);
v. Inventory of merchandise or production materials on total asset
vi. Loans on total asset
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Liquidity on total asset and the growth of sales are measures that account for the
transaction use of trade credit. We expect that the higher is the share of liquid
asset the less likely the ﬁrm uses trade credit. Conversely, when sales are growing
we expect that likelihood of observing trade credit also increases. Firm proﬁt may
be considered a proxy for ﬁrm cash ﬂow only in case proﬁt is not distributed. We
expect that trade credit is negatively correlated to proﬁt when a large share of
proﬁt is retained, because, for the pecking order argument, ﬁrms prefer to rely less
on external ﬁnance. On the other hand, when proﬁt are largely distributed, then
we could expect that the larger is the size of proﬁt the higher is the need for other
sources of ﬁnancing, such as trade credit. Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue that for
small ﬁrms ﬁrm age is a proxy for experience in the business. Some projects may
be feasible after and adequate level of experience is achieved. However, for larger
ﬁrms investment opportunities may decline in ﬁrm age (Petersen and Rajan, 1997).
Given that, it is diﬃcult to identify the way ﬁrm age determines the use of trade
credit. Inventories are a proxy of working capital needs that positively inﬂuence
trade credit. In order to account for ﬁrm capital structure we include the ratio of
loans on total asset.
To estimate the loan rate equation we use a set of X variables that includes the
following regressors. A dummy equal one if ﬁrm post collateral, which we expect
negatively correlated with the interest rate, as widely agreed in the literature. Loan
characteristics aﬀect the cost of credit. Given that it is likely that a ﬁxed interest
rate is associated with a higher cost of credit, we include a dummy equal one for
ﬁxed interest rate, that we expect to aﬀect positively the cost of credit. We also
include the dummy equal one if the loan is a mortgage. To consider possible bank
local market power we include a dummy equal one if the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman
bank deposit index of local banking market concentration is greater than 1800 (i.e.
highly concentrated). Credit score can be used to signal quality to the bank and
may have an eﬀect on interest rate. To measure this eﬀect we include a dummy
equal one if ﬁrm credit score is in the top 25% of the distribution. The literature
provide wide evidence of the positive relationship between entrepreneur experience
and ﬁrm proﬁt. To catch the managing experience eﬀect we include the number
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of years of the principal owner’s managing experience. We expect a negative eﬀect
on interest rate as we expect that a greater experience is positively correlated to
higher proﬁt and hence generating a higher probability of success for the ﬁrm. The
literature reports evidence that entrepreneurs that belong to a minority group rely
more heavily on their own funds to ﬁnance a start up. We include two dummies: the
ﬁrst is equal one if the principal owner is black, the other is equal one if the owner
belongs to other minority groups (asian, hispanic, asian paciﬁc, native american).
Firm’s proprietorship characteristic may have some eﬀect on credit availability and
loan contract due to diﬀerent agency costs compared to those of non-family owned
ﬁrms. To control for proprietorship eﬀects we include a dummy equal one if ﬁrm
is family owned. To account for diﬀerence in the monitoring cost we include the
distance in miles of the ﬁrm from the bank. Finally, to measure the impact of ﬁrm
ﬁnancial structure on the loan contract, the ratio of debt on total asset is included.
We follow the estimation procedure described above. We ﬁrst estimate equation
3.4.5 and we obtain the inverse Mills ratio λTC and λNTC . Then we estimate the
equations for the cost of credit augmented by including the inverse Mills ratios.
Results are reported in tables 3.1-3.3. In the standard switching model a positive
sign for the coeﬃcient of λTC means that there is a positive correlation between
the unexplained factors that aﬀect cost of credit and those that aﬀect the choice to
use trade credit. In both loan rate equations (tables 3.2 and 3.3) the inverse Mills
ratios are positive and signiﬁcant. This result implies that the mean loan rate for
those who use trade credit is higher than population average for trade credit users,
while the mean loan rate for those that do not use trade credit is lower than their
group population average. This is in line with the theoretical predictions: the ﬁrms
that use trade credit have a cost of credit above average both using and not using
trade credit, but are better oﬀ using trade credit than not using it. Firms that do
not use trade credit would be better oﬀ if they use trade credit compared to those
ﬁrms that actually use trade credit. Estimation also shows that the negative eﬀect
of posting collateral on loan rate is higher for ﬁrms not using trade credit. This
further corroborate the idea that less opaque ﬁrms, that do not need to use trade
credit, have a lower cost of credit. In addition, we conﬁrm that there is a selection
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eﬀect in the use of trade credit.
3.5.2 The endogenous switching model
To take into account the endogeneity between the use of trade credit and the cost
of credit we estimate the endogenous switching model in which the decision to use
trade credit is given by the reduced form in equation ??, from which we obtain the
inverse Mills ratio. The equation of the cost of credit augmented by the inverse
Mills ratios are then estimated. Finally we estimate equation ?? substituting back
the predicted values for the cost of credit for the two types. As in a simultaneous
equation system we need to specify the instruments to identify the model. This
means that we need at least one exclusion restriction that determines whether a
ﬁrm chooses to use trade credit but that does not determine the cost of bank credit.
As exclusion restriction we include the percentage of unused line of credit in the Z∗
variable set in trade credit equation ??. We consider this choice appropriate because
proximity to the line of credit limits proxies tightness in the use of short term funds
and it is likely that this aﬀects the decision to use trade credit. On the contrary,
the interest rate charged by the bank on the most recent loan it is likely that it does
not depend on the amount of unused line of credit. We report the results of the
estimation of equation ?? in table 3.4. The parameter δ is positive and signiﬁcant
showing that expected treatment eﬀect inﬂuences the decision to use trade credit.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we aimed to shed light the relationship existing between trade credit
and bank loan. The literature links the ﬁnancial motif of trade credit to the infor-
mation asymmetries in the credit market. In such framework, in which asymmetric
information may induce banks to ration their customers, trade credit is used as a
substitute or a complementary source of ﬁnancing for bank credit. While most of the
empirical evidence focused on the substitution hypothesis, little evidence has been
found on the complementarity hypothesis. We test this latter hypothesis stemming
from the theoretical model of Biais and Gollier (1997) according which trade credit
is used to alleviate credit rationing due to asymmetric information. This has im-
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plication on the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing probability and also on the interest rate charged
by the bank. We use an estimation methodology that takes into account the endo-
geneity between the use of trade credit and the loan contract oﬀered by the bank in
equilibrium. We then test the eﬀect of such decision on the bank interest rate.
Employing a switching regression approach we found that the information disclosure
brought conveyed by the use of trade credit is statistically signiﬁcant in the loan
rate equation. In addition we show that ﬁrms that use trade credit experience a
loan rate which is above average, while those that do not use it have an equilibrium
loan rate below average.
Employing an endogenous switching approach we identify the treatment eﬀect of
trade credit on interest rate. We found that the decision to use trade credit is
signiﬁcantly linked to diﬀerence in the expected interest rate. Our results provide
support to the empirical predictions of the Bias and Gollier (1997) model.
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Table 3.1: Probit estimation of the choice of trade credit Dep = Dummy=1 if ﬁrms uses
trade credit
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Liquidity on total asset -0.097713∗∗ (0.017514)
Proﬁt (thousands of $) 7.000000∗ (3.000000)
Dummy =1 if ﬁrms increased sales wrt three years before 0.246238∗∗ (0.021285)
Firm age (years) 0.014766∗∗ (0.000922)
Inventories on total asset 1.065808∗∗ (0.057429)





Table 3.2: Loan rate for ﬁrm using trade credit
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Inverse Mills ratio (λTC) 1.769890
∗∗ (0.232175)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm posted collateral -0.512068∗∗ (0.062099)
Dummy=1 if Fixed interest rate 1.194754∗∗ (0.062035)
Dummy=1 if lending was a mortgage 0.343116∗∗ (0.108555)
Banking market concentration: Dummy=1 if Herﬁndahl index> 1800 0.316046∗∗ (0.060399)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm’s Credit score is top 25% -0.056805 (0.062064)
Owner managing experience (n. of years) -0.011544∗∗ (0.003110)
Dummy=1 if Owner is black 0.684874∗ (0.322687)
Dummy=1 if Owner belongs to an ethnic minority other than black 0.769304∗∗ (0.126786)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm is family owned 0.050192 (0.071715)
Distance of ﬁrm from bank (miles) 0.001109∗∗ (0.000389)
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Table 3.3: Loan rate for ﬁrm not using trade credit
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Inverse Mills ratio (λNTC) 1.736449
∗∗ (0.419005)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm posted collateral -0.695271∗∗ (0.168521)
Dummy=1 if Fixed interest rate 1.517521∗∗ (0.162350)
Dummy=1 if lending was a mortgage 0.494262∗ (0.233305)
Banking market concentration: Dummy=1 if Herﬁndahl index> 1800 0.134714 (0.156812)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm’s Credit score is top 25% -0.754977∗∗ (0.167238)
Owner managing experience (n. of years) -0.043942∗∗ (0.007954)
Dummy=1 if Owner is black 1.090756∗ (0.459153)
Dummy=1 if Owner belongs to an ethnic minority other than black 1.769291∗∗ (0.297931)
Dummy=1 if ﬁrm is family owned -0.214935 (0.203530)
Distance of ﬁrm from bank (miles) -0.002973 (0.002643)





Table 3.4: Probit estimation of the choice of trade credit with endogenous switching. Dep
variable: Dummy=1 if ﬁrms uses trade credit
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
RTC −RNTC 0.255493∗∗ (0.028012)
Liquidity on total asset -0.541250∗∗ (0.076296)
Proﬁt (thousands of $) 0.000013† (8.000000)
Dummy =1 if ﬁrms increased sales wrt three years before 0.125804∗∗ (0.033824)
Firm age (years) 0.001679 (0.001631)
Inventories on total asset 0.648494∗∗ (0.092031)
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